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Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental 
Justice and the Minimum Content of 
Criminal Law 
Alan N. Young 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Otto Von Bismarck, the “Iron Chancellor” of the 19th-century German 
state, is credited with making the oft-quoted statement that “there are 
two things you don’t want to see being made — sausages and legislation.” 
Despite obvious improvements in the electoral and legislative processes 
in the past century, the Iron Chancellor’s pithy denigration of lawmaking 
is still asserted in modern times. Our contemporary legislative process 
aspires to democratic ideals but often breaks down from the pressures of 
political compromise and the influence of powerful interest groups. 
Some idealists believe that criminal law is built on a “consensus” model 
of community support, but there seem to be more people who subscribe 
to a “conflict” model in which the enactment of criminal law is often an 
unprincipled political response to the needs of the powerful.1 
If sausage-making and lawmaking is inherently messy and flawed, 
does this by default give the judiciary the authority to counter defects in 
the legislative process by invalidating hastily drafted criminal laws which 
do not appear to effectively serve the public interest? Does substantive 
review of criminal law to ensure compliance with the principles of 
fundamental justice under section 7, and compliance with the presumption 
of innocence under section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms,2 arm the judiciary with justifiable authority to place tangible 
limits on the criminal law power of Parliament? 
                                                                                                            

 Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1
 For an outline of the various schools of thought currently in vogue in criminological 
studies, see F. Schmalleger & R. Volk, Canadian Criminology Today: Theories and Application 
(Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2005), at 14-18; G. Vold, B. Thomas & J. Snipes, Theoretical Criminology, 
5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 228-54. 
2
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
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The conventional wisdom that courts cannot second-guess the policy 
choices made by a legislature rings hollow in a day and age when resort 
to criminal law as a response to a perceived social problem has become 
routine and perfunctory. The sausage-making factory of criminal law 
appears boundless and in need of some institutional constraints. Bismarck’s 
insult made me wonder whether a court would sit idly by if a ridiculous 
criminal law such as prohibiting the possession and sale of sausages  
were to be enacted. There is a perceived social problem underlying the 
prohibition — obesity and gastro-intestinal disorders are on the rise and 
surely a good sausage contributes to the problem. The prohibitory policy 
adopted in relation to intoxicant use, despite its obvious failure, shows 
that there is some legislative precedent for resorting to criminal law to 
punish bad consumption choices. Faced with a law of this nature, would 
a court restrict itself to formal questions like “is the definition of sausage 
unduly vague?” or “is it a constitutional requirement that the accused know 
he/she is selling a sausage?”, or would the court find some mechanism 
to invalidate the law on the basis that it is an ineffective and irrational 
response to the social and health problems associated with a bad diet? 
At a rudimentary level, the legislative and policy decision to 
criminalize conduct should be based on three deceptively simple questions: 
(1) Is the conduct harmful? (2) Does the nature and magnitude of the 
harm warrant the intervention of criminal law? (3) Can the criminal law 
effectively combat the harm without undue erosion of liberty and privacy? 
There are many different formulations of these questions, and an endless 
debate on the proper definition of harm, but, at a minimum, as Paul Roberts 
has noted: 
. . . the advocate of any particular criminal prohibition needs to supply 
a good reason, not just for generalized state interference in the lives of 
individuals, but for that special form of state regulation represented by 
criminal sanctions: that is, hard treatment (with serious implications for 
personal autonomy) administered through procedures specially designed 
to communicate the sting of blame or “censure”.3 
If a court were to engage in substantive review of the merits of criminal 
law then presumably it would be addressing questions of this nature. 
Despite the supposed taboo nature of this inquiry, the courts do address 
                                                                                                            
3
 Paul Roberts, “Philosophy, Feinberg, Codification, and Consent: A Progress Report on 
English Experiences of Criminal Law Reform” (2001) 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 173, at 217, in Vera 
Bergelson, “The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent” (2007) 75 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 165, at 183. 
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these questions under the guise of statutory interpretation, and even modest 
interpretation can serve to amend, revise and alter legislative policy 
choices.4 However, statutory interpretation leaves the criminal law 
somewhat intact whereas constitutional invalidation acts as a complete 
denial of legislative policy choices, and for this reason the popular 
sentiment is that the courts stray too far into the legislative domain if 
they invalidate criminal law solely on the basis of a negative assessment 
of the law’s merits. 
This paper has two modest objectives. The primary purpose is to 
chronicle and assess the operation of the principles of fundamental 
justice, and the presumption of innocence, in setting minimum standards 
for the enactment of criminal law. To that end, 106 appellate decisions 
were reviewed5 to determine if the developing jurisprudence under 
section 7 of the Charter has been informed by a clear and coherent 
theory of criminal law. The secondary purpose to is provide a practical 
justification for expanding substantive review to include a more vigorous 
assessment of the merits of the criminal law. The debate over the scope 
of substantive review is thorny and this paper will not wade too deeply 
into the debate. The support for substantive review presented in this paper 
arises primarily from the belief that the legislative process with respect 
to criminal law is uniquely flawed. Professor William Stuntz’s provocative 
and persuasive article, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law”, 6 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique flaws, and much of the 
inspiration for my assertion of expanded substantive review is drawn from 
his work. A snapshot of his analysis is contained in the following passage: 
One of the bedrock principles of criminal law is that legislatures, not 
courts, should be the primary definers of crime. The usual reason given 
is that judicial crime creation carries too big a risk of non-majoritarian 
crimes, which in turn creates too much of a risk that ordinary people 
won’t know what behavior can get them into trouble. The image is of 
                                                                                                            
4
 Two dramatic examples in which statutory interpretation has resulted in a significant 
alteration of the elements of the crime are: R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, 150 C.C.C. (3d) 321 
(S.C.C.) (child pornography) and Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 180 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (S.C.C.) (correction of child by force). 
5
 I reviewed 106 appellate decisions in seven categories (mens rea, presumption of 
innocence, harm principle, consent, arbitrariness (overbreadth), vagueness and defences). In addition 
to Supreme Court of Canada cases, I reviewed appellate decisions if they have not been overtaken 
by a Supreme Court decision (e.g., from 1982-85 there were numerous appellate decisions on the 
reverse onus for the offence of possession for the purpose — as the Supreme Court in R. v. Oakes, 
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) dealt with this issue, these appellate decisions 
were not included in the survey). 
6
 W. Stuntz, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law” (2001) 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505. 
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legislatures that faithfully represent popular norms, and hence accurately 
define the universe of serious norm-breakers, while prudish old judges 
seek to impose their unrepresentative values on an unfortunate population. 
. . . It turns out that both the argument and the image are backward. It is 
legislators who are likely to criminalize conduct ordinary people might 
innocently engage in — not in order to punish that conduct, but in 
order to take symbolic stands or make punishment of other conduct easier. 
Court’s lawmaking tendencies are more balanced, less tilted in favor 
of broader liability. The places in criminal law where liability has been 
expanded are almost all the product of legislation. The few places where 
liability has contracted find their source in judicial opinions.7 
The establishment by the judiciary of minimum standards for valid 
criminal law can only be achieved if supported by a clear and consistent 
theoretical vision of the role of criminal law in modern society. Presumably, 
the courts would have a better-developed theoretical perspective than 
would the average politician, and this expertise provides the courts with 
some justification for reviewing the substantive content of criminal law. 
In fairness to the courts, it must be recognized that there is no theoretical 
consensus on the role of criminal law. Professor George Fletcher has 
convincingly argued for a “polycentric” theory of the nature of criminal 
law in which no single principle can possibly provide an adequate account 
of the content of criminal law.8 Both scholars and lawmakers must 
“resist the temptation to reduce the criminal law to a single formula for 
determining when conduct ought to be treated as criminal”.9 Criminal 
law has not been built on a monolithic theory. In fact, “what counts as 
crime at one place and time, culture, or location may not be considered 
criminal at another time, in another culture, or even across the street.”10 
Despite the protean nature of criminal law and criminal law theory, it is 
submitted that the morality of aspiration obligates the judiciary to set limits 
to criminalization under the umbrella of the principles of fundamental 
justice, and this task is next to impossible without some rudimentary 
theoretical framework or orientation. 
                                                                                                            
7
 W. Stuntz, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law” (2001) 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 
at 576; for a similar article, see, A.J. Ashworth, “Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?” (2000) 116 
Law Q. Rev. 
8
 Douglas Husak, “Crimes Outside the Core” (2004) 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 755, at 757. 
9
 George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), at xxii. 
10
 Mark M. Lanier & Stuart Henry, “Crime in Context: The Scope of the Problem” in Stuart 
Henry & Mark M. Lanier, eds., What Is Crime? Controversies over the Nature of Crime and What to 
Do about It (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2001), at 7. 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) DONE NOTHING WRONG 445 
In the excitement of the early days of the Charter, the Supreme 
Court in 1985 appeared to send a signal that substantive review of the 
criminal law would be vigorous and exacting. Without qualification, the 
Court expressed a broad and general limit on the content of the criminal 
law. Justice Lamer (as he then was) stated: 
A law that has the potential to convict a person who has not really 
done anything wrong offends the principles of fundamental justice 
and, if imprisonment is available as a penalty, such a law then violates 
a person’s right to liberty under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms . . . . 11 
This statement suggested that the principles of fundamental justice 
would not simply engage the issue of a minimum standard of mens rea 
or fault. The invocation of the word “wrong” seemed to imply that a court 
could strike down an offence that did not contain sufficient elements to 
constitute a moral or legal wrong warranting the criminal sanction. To 
fuel the fire that judicial review could extend to the review of the 
supposed political question of the wrongfulness of the act, Lamer J. 
noted that fundamental justice was not restricted to procedural concerns 
and natural justice, and that “[t]he task of the Court is not to choose 
between substantive content or procedural content per se but to secure 
for persons ‘the full benefit of the Charter’s protection’ . . . while avoiding 
adjudication of the merits of public policy”.12 A few years later, Lamer J. 
dropped the admonishment of avoiding review of merits and simply 
stated that “while Parliament retains the power to define the elements of 
a crime, the courts now have the jurisdiction and, more important, the 
duty, when called upon to do so, to review that definition to ensure that 
it is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”13   
As might be expected, the Supreme Court’s approach to substantive 
review has been fraught with ambiguity. In the same breath, the Court 
says that the Charter has not enabled the courts to “decide upon  
the appropriateness of policies underlying legislative enactments . . . 
however, the courts are empowered, indeed required, to measure the 
content of legislation against the guarantees of the Constitution”  
                                                                                                            
11
 Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486, at 492 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”]. 
12
 Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486, at 499 (S.C.C.). 
13
 R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 652 (S.C.C.). 
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(emphasis added).14 In light of the mixed messages emanating from the 
Court on the limits of substantive review, this paper will not attempt to 
define the nature, scope and history of the concept of substantive review, but 
rather will simply attempt to ascertain whether the judicial implementation 
of section 7 has explicitly or implicitly set definable limits on the content 
of a valid criminal enactment. In Part I of the paper, I explore the open-
ended structure of the terms and conditions of section 7 to demonstrate 
that there are no obvious impediments or obstacles in the provision, or 
the emerging jurisprudence, to prevent the construction and development 
of minimum standards for the enactment of constitutionally valid criminal 
law. In this Part, I will also provide a practical justification for wide-
ranging substantive review. In Part II of the paper, I will outline the nature 
and scope of minimum constitutional standards which have emerged in 
the past 25 years, and will demonstrate that the courts have not warmly 
embraced Lamer J.’s invitation to set minimum standards relating to the 
“wrongfulness” of the criminal offence. 
In any discussion of limits on criminalization, one should pay homage 
to division of powers cases under the BNA Act15 However, this paper 
will not discuss this aspect of limitations primarily because the BNA Act 
jurisprudence adds very little to the goal of setting minimum standards. 
For the most part, the division of powers requirements for proper exercise 
of the criminal law power amount to little more than a formal requirement 
of a blanket prohibition accompanied by a punishment. Nonetheless, the 
inspiration for this paper can be found in a 1948 division of powers case 
in which the Supreme Court invalidated a criminal prohibition on the 
sale of margarine on the basis that the scientific evidence supporting the 
harms of margarine consumption had been refuted and it appeared that the 
prohibition simply served the purpose of protecting the dairy industry.16 
If judicial review can lead to invalidation of a law when the passage of 
time demonstrates that the law serves no valid purpose, then it stands to 
reason that invalidation should be allowed if one can demonstrate that 
the law was ill-conceived from its inception. 
                                                                                                            
14
 Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486, at 496 (S.C.C.). 
15
 British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (now Constitution Act, 1867). 
16
 Reference re Validity of section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act (Canada), [1948] S.C.J. 
No. 42, [1949] S.C.R. 1, [1949] 1 D.L.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Margarine Reference”]. 
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II. AN OPEN INVITATION TO SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW 
1. Justifying Substantive Review 
Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation has spawned an 
endless debate about the justifiability of allowing a non-elected institution, 
the judiciary, to oversee the development of public policy. Not only 
have concerns been raised about the institutional and political ramifications 
of blurring the legislative and judicial branches of government, but many 
concerns have been raised about judicial capacity for setting public policy 
and implementing rules. The concerns commonly revolve around one or 
more of the following assertions: 
(1) Courts do not set their decision-making agenda. The issues raised for 
their consideration are restricted by the fortuities of litigation. The 
litigants are responsible for setting the agenda, and the issues raised 
may be distorted by the motives and resources of the litigants. 
(2) Adjudication is focused and incremental judges are called upon to 
decide legal entitlement by determining which party has a legal right 
and which party has a legal duty. This process is distinct from that of 
a legislative planner who must ask “what are the alternatives?” The 
responsibility to resolve the particular dispute handicaps the court in 
gaining a perspective on the broad contextual setting of the issues. 
(3) Judges are generalists and they lack sufficient specialized expertise 
to master the intricacies of various policy problems. 
(4) The fact-finding process of adjudication makes it ill-suited for 
ascertaining relevant social facts. The evidentiary rules of admissibility 
place artificial constraints on a judge’s ability to receive information 
that may be vital for the development of policy yet irrelevant for the 
disposition of the particular case. 
(5) Courts lack the power to enforce compliance with their decrees. In 
addition, the adjudicative process is not equipped for the monitoring 
of the policy implications of any decision.17 
                                                                                                            
17
 For a fuller discussion of judicial incapacity, see D. Horowitz, Courts and Social Policy 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977); M. Cappelletti, “The Law-Making Power of the Judge 
and Its Limits: A Comparative Analysis” (1981) 8 Monash U.L. Rev. 15. 
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As Professor Hogg has said: “[t]he anti-majoritarian objection to 
judicial review and the debate it sparks is primarily an academic one”,18 
and it is beyond the scope of this paper to outline and evaluate the various 
objections which have been raised in academic circles. In many ways, 
the Supreme Court has indicated that it has no interest in engaging the 
academic debate which continues to rage on. In the Motor Vehicle 
Reference, the Crown argued for a narrow interpretation of the principles of 
fundamental justice on the basis that “the judiciary is neither representative 
of, nor responsive to the electorate on whose behalf, and under whose 
authority policies are selected and given effect in the laws of the land.”19 
Justice Lamer (as he then was) quickly dismissed this argument: 
 This is an argument which was heard countless times prior to the 
entrenchment of the Charter but which has in truth, for better or for 
worse, been settled by the very coming into force of the Constitution 
Act, 1982. It ought not be forgotten that the historic decision to entrench 
the Charter in our Constitution was taken not by the courts but by  
the elected representatives of the people of Canada. It was those 
representatives who extended the scope of constitutional adjudication 
and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous responsibility.20 
Like the Supreme Court, this paper will not address the academic 
debate, but, instead, will focus on a few practical reasons why judicial 
review should extend to a vigorous substantive review of criminal law 
even if this requires some judicial assessment of the merits of the law. 
First, it should be acknowledged that this form of review is already taking 
place whether or not the court explicitly recognizes its intrusion into the 
political realm. As Peter Russell has noted: 
[Judges] may mask their non-legal ideas or assumptions and make their 
opinion appear as if it were a purely legal deduction ... Judges who 
conceal their political, social or economic reasoning may be pursuing 
a fairly cunning political strategy designed to reduce the political exposure 
of their court.21 
                                                                                                            
18
 Peter W. Hogg, “Charter Dialogue Revisited — or ‘Much Ado About Metaphors’” 
(2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at 8. 
19
 Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486, at 497 (S.C.C.).  
20
 Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486, at 497 (S.C.C.). 
21
 P. Russell, “Comment” in A.M. Linden, ed., The Canadian Judiciary (Toronto: Osgoode 
Hall Law School, York University, 1976), at 85-86. 
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In 2006, a badly divided Supreme Court assessed and reviewed the 
merits of public healthcare and concluded that serious deficiencies in the 
public system required the constitutional invalidation of a prohibition on 
obtaining insurance for private health care.22 The Court recognized that 
its review was an intrusion into a purely political consideration, i.e., the 
merits of an exclusive and universal healthcare system and the efficient 
allocation of resources to administer this system, but this did not stop 
the Court. McLachlin C.J.C. noted that “‘it is the high duty of this  
Court to insure that the Legislatures do not transgress the limits of their 
constitutional mandate’”23 and “[t]he fact that the matter is complex, 
contentious or laden with social values does not mean that the courts can 
abdicate the responsibility”24 of review. Substantive review is not beyond 
the authority of the Court, and “[t]he mere fact that this question may 
have policy ramifications does not permit us to avoid answering it.”25 
I recognize that an ongoing practice of substantive review in a few 
cases does not provide a compelling justification for the practice, but 
one may reasonably conclude that if the Supreme Court is willing to review 
a purely political question, such as the merits of universal healthcare, 
then surely there should be less concern or objection when a court decides 
to review the merits of a criminal prohibition. There is no question that a 
court has much greater expertise than a legislature when it comes to the 
issue of criminal responsibility. Even though criminal lawmaking is 
fundamentally different from ascriptions of liability, it is sometimes 
forgotten from a historical perspective that the judiciary has exercised 
an overt lawmaking power — at common law the courts readily created 
crimes in their role as “custos morum [guardians of morality] of all the 
King’s subjects”.26 
In 1955, the authority of the court to create new common law crimes 
was abolished as judge-made crime posed insurmountable problems in 
terms of vagueness and retroactivity. In addition, a common law crime 
was created without the benefit of input and consultation other than the 
parties and the inferences to be drawn from the situation before the court. 
                                                                                                            
22 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35 [hereinafter 
“Chaoulli”]. 
23
 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35, at para. 107 
(S.C.C.). 
24
 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35, at para. 107 
(S.C.C.). 
25
 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35, at para. 108 
(S.C.C.). 
26
 R. v. Sedley (1663), 1 Sid. 168, 82 E.R. 1036, Curll, v. 17 (1727) 155. 
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This can be a dangerous practice as it undercuts the primary distinction 
between tort and crime in that a crime is considered a public wrong 
“because through [it] the commonwealth and not just a single individual 
is exposed to danger”.27 Danger to the commonwealth can only be 
ascertained with the type of consultative process which is part and parcel 
of the legislative process. Nonetheless, many of our current offences are 
just codifications of judge-made law and the fact that the judiciary had 
the power and authority for centuries to create crime defuses some of 
the objections relating to substantive review which are based on judicial 
incompetency or inexperience. 
In theory, legislative power to create crime is institutionally superior 
to lawmaking at common law because of the ability of the legislature to 
transcend the crisis of one case and through extensive consultation arrive 
at a rational and principled decision regarding the fundamental question 
of whether certain conduct warrants criminalization. A healthy dose of 
skepticism would suggest that on occasion the legislative process will 
not be a principled and consultative response to a social problem. The 
failure of the legislative branch to live up to its democratic ideals can 
manifest itself in a number of different ways: 
Aspects of Canadian politics vulnerable to criticism on democratic 
grounds are legion, and include the minimal diversity in Parliament 
(particularly, the lack of women, Aboriginal peoples, and minorities); 
the limited role of backbenchers; the appointment process and powers 
of the Senate; unfixed elections and the legitimacy of the plurality 
voting system (“first past the post”); hard-line party politics and the 
infrequency of free votes in Parliament: infrequent use of referenda; 
and the lack of policy expertise in Parliament.28 
One need only look to the 1980s reform of our gambling laws to 
quickly see how the enactment of criminal law is not always a principled 
and rational approach to addressing a social problem.29 The short history 
                                                                                                            
27
 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
trans. by John Ladd (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), at 35-36, as quoted in Jean Hampton, 
“Retribution and the Liberal State” (1994) 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 117, at 122. 
28
 Carissima Mathen, “Dialogue Theory, Judicial Review, and Judicial Supremacy: A Comment 
on ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 125, at 142. 
29
 See, e.g., J. Osborne & C. Campbell, “Recent Amendments to Canadian Lottery and 
Gaming Laws: The Transfer of Power from Federal to Provincial Governments” in C. Campbell & 
J. Lowman, eds., Gambling in Canada: Golden Goose or Trojan Horse?: A Report from the First 
National Symposium on Lotteries and Gambling, May 1988 (Burnaby, B.C.: School of Criminology, 
Simon Fraser University, 1989); P. Monahan & A.G. Goldlist, “Roll Again: New Developments 
Concerning Gaming” (1999) 42 Crim. L.Q. 182. 
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of casinos and video lottery terminals in Canada is rather disconcerting. 
Historically, gambling was considered an immoral activity which warranted 
criminalization because for some it could lead to poverty, family 
breakdown and the rendering of the subject a ward of the state. In the 
early 20th century, small incremental legislative exceptions were developed 
primarily relating to lotteries, charitable gaming and horse racing, but a 
solid core of criminal offences remained in the Code. In 1985-86, the 
federal government was short on cash for the Calgary Winter Olympics 
and a deal was struck with the provinces whereby the federal government 
would receive $100 million in exchange for an amendment to the Criminal 
Code30 giving the provinces exclusive jurisdiction to conduct and manage 
a wide range of gambling operations. Now there are over 60 casinos in 
Canada and the industry generates billions of dollars for provincial coffers. 
For purely economic reasons, gambling was transformed from an immoral 
crime to an activity promoted by government officials to increase state 
revenues. Without a doubt, this contract to amend the Criminal Code both 
metaphorically and literally demonstrates that the enactment of criminal 
law is often corrupted by the pursuits of private interests. 
If the legislative process is demonstrably flawed with respect to 
enactment of a particular criminal law, there seems to be no reason for 
deference and timidity when a court is asked to review the contents of this 
law. There may be insurmountable evidentiary problems in demonstrating 
the existence of a flawed legislative process, but if there is evidence to 
show an absence of a reasonable basis for enacting the prohibition then 
the judiciary should not be reluctant to enter the legislative domain. 
Unfortunately, with respect to criminal law, there will always be a 
haunting suspicion that the legislative process may be flawed in light of 
the visceral response which often accompanies discussion of wrongdoing. 
The highly emotive content of criminal wrongdoing has paved the way for 
continuous “domain expansion”31 by the state. As the Law Commission of 
Canada has recently noted: 
 In Canada discussions of crime and what to do about it have 
become commonplace. In recent years newspaper articles, community-
level discussions, and policy making have all acted as venues through 
which to express a desire for harsher criminal sanctions — a “lock ‘em 
up and throw away the key” approach to crime. “Such ‘lawandorder’ 
                                                                                                            
30
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
31
 Joel Best, Random Violence: How We Talk about New Crimes and New Victims 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), at 61-62. 
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talk . . . has become a dominant and daily feature of public culture as 
we embark on this new millennium. In our latter-day ‘risk society’, 
security is purportedly in short supply and menacing outsiders imperil 
us from all sides”. . . . As Garland . . . argues, “the background affect 
of policy is now more frequently a collective anger and a righteous 
demand for retribution rather than a commitment to a just, socially 
engineered solution. The emotional temperature of policy-making has 
shifted from cool to hot”.32 
Further suspicion is cast upon the integrity of criminal lawmaking 
by the abrupt volte-face in North American criminal justice policy in the 
past 40 years. Starting with the Wolfendon Report and Hart-Devlin debate 
in the late 1950s,33 and continuing in the 1960s with a strong academic 
movement to condemn the legislative practice of overcriminalization,34 
there was an emerging consensus that criminal law was not an appropriate 
and effective public policy response to every social problem. It became 
clear in the 1970s that criminal law was a “blunt instrument”35 to be 
used with caution and restraint. In Canada, the notion of criminal law 
restraint found expression in the 1969 Ouimet Report.36 In 1976, the 
Law Reform Commission of Canada published Our Criminal Law, and 
in 1982 the Government of Canada itself published The Criminal Law in 
Canadian Society. Both texts sing the same song: 
The basic theme, however, is important, in stressing that the criminal 
law ought to be reserved for reacting to conduct that is seriously 
harmful. The harm may be caused or threatened to the physical safety 
or integrity of individuals, or through interference with their property. 
It may be caused or threatened to the collective safety or integrity of 
society through the infliction of direct damage or the undermining of 
what the Law Reform Commission terms fundamental or essential 
values — those values or interests necessary for social life to be 
                                                                                                            
32
 Nathalie Des Rosiers & Steven Bittle, “Introduction” in Law Commission of Canada, ed., 
What Is a Crime? Defining Criminal Conduct in Contemporary Society (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 
at xi. 
33
 See Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution  (London: 
HMSO, 1957); Lord P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); 
H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). 
34
 Sanford H. Kadish, “The Crisis of Overcriminalization” (1967) 374 The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 157 and Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of  
the Criminal Sanction (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968).  
35
 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our Criminal Law (Ottawa: The Commission, 1976),  
at 27. 
36
 Canadian Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections 
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1969), at 12. 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) DONE NOTHING WRONG 453 
carried on, or for the maintenance of the kind of society cherished by 
Canadians. Since many acts may be “harmful”, and since society has 
many other means for controlling or responding to conduct, criminal law 
should be used only when the harm caused or threatened is serious, 
and when the other, less coercive or less intrusive means do not work 
or are inappropriate.37 
For many reasons which remain unclear, the tide changed in the 1980s 
with a return to knee-jerk criminalization and increased punitiveness. In 
2004, the following description of the shift in policy in the United States 
and Britain reflects the state of affairs in Canada: 
American and British attitudes toward crime are currently undergoing 
a profound transformation, the effects of which are manifest in the 
insistence of the public on exacting retribution from the criminal, and 
on being protected at any cost. These “righteous demands for retribution”, 
these requests for absolute security, are matched by a governmental 
emphasis on prevention as the new overarching aim of the criminal 
justice system, and one that is deemed to justify all manners of 
interference with the private lives of offenders.38 
In both Canada and the United States “crime and punishment have 
become a cultural obsession of modernity”.39 The integrity of the 
lawmaking process has been called into question because “criminal law 
has become highly politicized”40 and “the single most visible development 
in the substantive criminal law is that the sheer number of criminal 
offences has grown exponentially”.41 The wisdom of restraint has  
been forgotten and because “the criminal law has undergone enormous 
transformation in the [past] twenty-five years . . . it is important to 
appreciate the urgent need for limitations on the scope of the criminal 
sanction”.42 
A simple explanation for the recent growth in criminal law would be 
a consistent and substantial increase in the severity and frequency of crime, 
                                                                                                            
37
 Government of Canada, The Criminal Law in Canadian Society (Ottawa: Govt. of Canada, 
1982); Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our Criminal Law (Ottawa: The Commision, 1976). 
38
 Véronique Voruz, “Recent Perspectives on Penal Punitiveness” in Bruce A. Arrigo, ed., 
Psychological Jurisprudence: Critical Explorations in Law, Crime, and Society  (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2004), at 157. 
39
 L. Snider, “Abusing Corporate Power: The Death of a Concept”, in S. Boyd, D. Chunn & 
R. Menzies, eds., [Ab]Using Power: The Canadian Experience (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2001). 
40
 Douglas A. Berman, “The Model Penal Code Second: Might ‘Film Schools’ Be in Need 
of a Remake?” (2003) 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 163, at 164-65. 
41
 Douglas Husak, “Crimes Outside the Core” (2004) 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 755, at 768. 
42
 W. Stuntz, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law” (2001) 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, at 767. 
454 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
but the fact is that crime rates have been dropping in North America 
since the crime explosion from 1962-80 (ironically the time period in 
which the notion of criminal law restraint had gained ascendency).43 There 
have been no significant crime waves to warrant the sudden return to 
overcriminalization, yet there has been a perception that urban society 
has been hit by a tidal wave of crime. As has been pointed out by 
Professor Joel Best: 
. . . criminologists usually doubt claims about crime waves. Crime waves, 
they say, are really waves in media attention: they occur because the 
media, for whatever reason, fix upon some sort of crime, and publicize it. 
Crimes that might ordinarily receive little notice suddenly become the 
subject of editorials, feature articles, op-ed pieces, columns, editorial 
cartoons, talk-show commentary, and late-show monologues — the 
full treatment used to focus attention on social problems. In this view, 
crime waves really are just waves of crime news. 
Crime waves seem to have been a nineteenth-century invention. For many 
reasons — including rising literacy, urbanization, faster communication, 
and, especially, improvements in printing technology — it was in the 
nineteenth century that newspapers assumed their essential modern form, 
emphasizing reports or current — and especially sensational — events.44 
If a newspaper could manufacture a crime wave in the 19th century, 
the digital revolution of contemporary times can easily create a moral 
panic. Moral panics are largely orchestrated by the media’s construction 
of crime,45 and the resulting clamour from a frightened public often leads 
to a hastily drafted and ill-conceived legislative response. The concept 
of moral panic originated among British sociologists of deviance46 and 
has in recent years been employed in American academic circles to explain 
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the creation, or strengthening, of criminal laws relating to stalking, gang 
violence, freeway violence and other crimes.47 Moral panic theory has 
also been used to explain the origins of Canadian drug policy.48 Even the 
RCMP has acknowledged the dangers of media magnification and last 
year released a report criticizing the Canadian media for instilling an 
unnatural fear of rising crime.49 
There is good reason to believe that the recent exponential growth in 
criminal law can be explained, in part, by moral panic theory due to 
media magnification. As moral panics arise from the rapid spread of 
misinformation and hyperbole, they are a dangerous foundation from 
which to launch a new criminal justice policy initiative. It has been 
argued that recent legislative initiatives in Canada relating to gangs and 
terrorists were triggered by moral panics,50 and it is not surprising that 
this legislation has been met with a series of constitutional challenges.51 
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Both the anti-biker and anti-terrorism provisions have been challenged 
under section 7 on the basis of vagueness and overbreadth — problems 
relating to the proper definition of the targeted conduct. In addition, the 
ambitious complexity of the new laws has presented serious difficulties 
for the successful prosecution of these offences.52 Moral panics often 
lead to poorly defined legislative responses in part due to haste and in 
part due to hysteria. Similarly, in the past few years in Ontario, there was 
growing concern, or panic, over dangers presented by fighting dogs such 
as the pit-bull. The legislative response of a ban on breeding was quickly 
challenged, with some success, on the basis of vagueness and overbreadth.53 
Presumably, most criminal law is enacted after a principled 
consideration of the relevant issues, but there is abundant evidence to 
suggest that this is not always the case. There is, and should be, a 
presumption of regularity with respect to legislative enactments, but I 
fail to see any reason why the government cannot be called upon to justify 
its policy choice to prohibit and punish when a reasonable basis has been 
established to call into question the merits of the law. Presumably, the 
government should be in possession of information demonstrating that it 
has not merely responded to a moral panic and that it has rationally 
responded to a documented social problem of some magnitude. 
With the 2006 election of Stephen Harper and the Conservative 
Party came many promises of enacting mandatory minimum sentences 
for a variety of existing and proposed crimes.54 Minimum sentences had 
been used sparingly in Canada (e.g., first degree murder, use of firearm, 
repeat impaired driving) and the value of this inflexible sentencing 
approach has been criticized, and condemned, by many social scientists 
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for its illusory deterrent effects.55 Critics of the Harper proposals have 
claimed that the proposals will cost anywhere from $5 billion to $11.5 
billion over the next 10 years.56 In supporting the notion of an expanded 
form of substantive review of the merits of criminal law, I am not 
suggesting that the courts should be empowered to invalidate legislation 
on the basis that it would be difficult or costly to implement. Allocation 
of scarce resources is a paradigmatic political question and is well beyond 
the expertise of the courts.57 
On the other hand, the merits of criminal law often engage questions 
which are clearly within the scope of the competence of the courts. In 
proposing the wide-ranging use of mandatory minimum sentences, public 
officials have made the claim that these sentences will have a significant 
deterrent impact on the incidence of crime. A reporter from the Ottawa 
Citizen made a request from the office of the Minister of Justice of 
Canada for the studies being relied upon to support this claim. The reporter 
was provided with five studies and upon a careful review, the reporter 
concluded that the studies were “old”, “misleading”, “methodologically 
flawed”, “underwhelming” and “proves exactly the opposite”.58 
Admittedly, criminological data can be conflicting and ambiguous, but 
when there is evidence that the government is relying upon faulty data 
concerning penal policy, there does not seem to be any reason why a 
court would not be competent to review this data even if the review 
appears to be calling into question the merits of the state policy. 
Substantive review of the merits of criminal legislation is generally 
frowned upon because it is seen as an invasion of the legislative domain 
by non-elected officials who will simply be reviewing the law on the 
basis of their personal opinion or perspective on criminal justice. As the 
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized: “[t]he principles of fundamental 
justice leave a great deal of scope for personal judgment and the Court 
must be careful that they do not become principles which are of 
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fundamental justice in the eye of the beholder only.”59 This is a powerful 
claim but it is largely an academic objection with little practical impact. 
The unique structure of the Charter of Rights reduces, if not eliminates, 
the risk of a judicial autocracy in terms of criminal justice policy. 
The notwithstanding clause, “the puzzle at the centre of the Charter”,60 
significantly reduces the risk that substantive review could ever defeat the 
will of the people as supposedly reflected in the acts of Parliamentarians. 
It is thought that the notwithstanding clause cannot be routinely invoked 
to maintain Parliamentary supremacy because it would be an act of 
political suicide for the political party compelled to invoke the clause. I 
think this reservation is vastly overstated in the context of criminal law. 
If a court were to conclude that Parliament did not have a reasonable 
basis for enacting a criminal law, in all likelihood this finding of arbitrary 
and unprincipled lawmaking could be attributed to some form of moral 
panic and political posturing. If the political climate is one of moral panic 
then an invocation of the notwithstanding clause would not be political 
suicide as it would likely be seen as political heroism by the majority of 
voters. 
A more vigorous form of substantive review of the merits of criminal 
legislation is also consistent with the “dialogue” theory of constitutional 
adjudication. This theory was originally conceived of by scholars61 but it 
has been referred to in at least 10 decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada.62 The Court has said: 
 As I view the matter, the Charter has given rise to a more dynamic 
interaction among the branches of governance. This interaction has 
been aptly described as a “dialogue” by some. . . . 
 To my mind, a great value of judicial review and this dialogue 
among the branches is that each of the branches is made somewhat 
accountable to the other. The work of the legislature is reviewed  
by the courts and the work of the court in its decisions can be reacted 
to by the legislature in the passing of new legislation (or even 
overarching laws under s. 33 of the Charter). This dialogue between 
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and accountability of each of the branches have the effect of enhancing 
the democratic process, not denying it.63  
(emphasis added) 
The notion of a continuing dialogue between court and lawmaker 
could include the idea of a lawmaking partnership with ultimate authority 
provided to the lawmaker in the event of irreconcilable differences. The 
role of the judiciary in this lawmaking partnership would be restricted to 
substantive review but this expanded role does not unduly upset the balance 
of power and would surely lead to greater political accountability. 
The law relating to the defence of extreme intoxication is one example 
of both the best and worst of a dialogue among partners. In the Daviault 
case,64 the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to revisit the common 
law rule which prevented raising intoxication as a defence to general 
intent crimes (primarily assault-related crimes). The Court ruled that the 
principles of fundamental justice required that all acts be voluntary and 
therefore, even for acts of assault, extreme intoxication “akin to automatism 
or insanity” must be an available defence. A media outcry ensued in which 
headlines read “drunks who rape and go free; top court ruling means law 
should be changed”,65 and Parliament swiftly responded by enacting 
section 33.1 of the Criminal Code,66
 
which effectively reversed the decision. 
It remains unclear whether this legislative response was enacted in a 
moral panic or whether it was a principled decision based upon the 
government’s efforts to collect expert evidence to determine if “extreme 
intoxication akin to automatism” was a scientifically sound and recognized 
phenomenon.67 Nonetheless, the scientific evidence was collected and 
Parliament had the final word through legislative enactment. On one hand, 
a coherent dialogue and lawmaking partnership was fostered by the Court 
in setting a minimum standard for the actus reus and related defences, 
and Parliament responding by concluding that this minimum standard 
did not apply in these circumstances because automatism due to heavy 
drinking was not a recognized pharmacological phenomenon. 
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On the other hand, the dysfunctional68 nature of the dialogue theory is 
represented by Parliament’s cavalier approach to establishing its supremacy. 
Presumably, Parliament should have invoked the notwithstanding clause 
to overturn a decision based upon constitutional principles, and as a 
practical matter, this act of defiance would not be political suicide in the 
political climate. In fact, there was another mechanism available to 
maintain an open dialogue with the courts when substantive review 
interferes with legislative policy. Upon the collection of the relevant 
scientific evidence, it would have been open to the Attorney General of 
Canada to make a formal reference to the Supreme Court of Canada to 
determine whether the enactment of section 33.1 could be upheld as a 
reasonable limitation in light of newly acquired evidence to support the 
rationality of the legislative policy to deny the defence of intoxication 
for crimes against the person. The failure of the government to proceed 
in this fashion shows a level of distrust which does not bode well for a 
healthy and fruitful dialogue. 
Nonetheless, while the metaphoric portrayal of lawmaking as dialogue 
is a sensible concept it must be recognized that “[d]ialogue is . . . the 
consequence of a decision striking down legislation, not an independent 
reason for striking it down.”69 The notion of dialogue, and the existence 
of the notwithstanding option, only provides a comfort zone for substantive 
review of the content of criminal law, and this form of extended review 
must fit within the text of the Charter and its evolving doctrine. The 
American-conceived concept of substantive review never fit well within 
the text of the Fifth Amendment70 due process clause, but the open-ended 
and ambiguous formulation of section 7 of the Charter provides a more 
suitable anchor for substantive review. 
2. Section 7 — A World of Infinite Possibility 
If substantive review can be justified on the basis of legislative 
dysfunctionality, the constitutional anchor for this practice clearly resides 
in the open-ended generality of section 7. In the American setting, 
Sandford Kadish has characterized the Fifth Amendment71 due process 
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clause “in its substantive persona” as a “protean pinch hitter of last resort”,72 
and this characterization equally applies to our Fifth Amendment 
counterpart. Textual arguments and arguments over the intent of the 
drafters could be raised to narrow the scope of fundamental justice, but 
these arguments have been largely disregarded by both the Supreme 
Court of Canada and academic commentators.73 Much ink has been spilt 
to show how the current approach to section 7 has transformed the right 
into one of boundless possibility,74 and this paper will not replicate these 
useful commentaries. Rather, this part of the paper will simply provide a 
brief overview of the way in which section 7 has been transformed into 
a “protean pinch hitter”. 
The strength and power of section 7 is contingent upon two variables 
— the interpretation of the terms, “life, liberty and security”, and the 
elucidation of the content of the principles of fundamental justice. The 
threshold issue of “life, liberty and security” serves as a gatekeeper to 
decide what types of claims of “deprivation” will warrant judicial review, 
and to determine if the deprivation is in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice. The gatekeeper issue is an important component 
in the assessment of the impact of section 7, but in a paper of this brevity I 
have chosen to focus on the more elusive question of what constitutes a 
principle of fundamental justice. 
Specifically, this paper concerns the operation of these fundamental 
principles in the context of criminal law and as criminal law by definition 
will always entail a deprivation of liberty, any criminal provision has to 
operate in a manner which is consistent with principles of fundamental 
justice. Criminal law attracts constitutional review under section 7 not 
only because of its liberty-depriving potential. The Supreme Court has 
also ruled that state-imposed psychological stress or trauma occasioned by 
invocation of the criminal law will violate the security interest protected 
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by section 7.75 However, there has been little reason to evaluate the 
constitutionality of criminal law in terms of its impact on security since 
the easiest route for fundamental justice review of criminal law lies in 
the fact that all crime is potentially punished by imprisonment. 
Although the application of section 7 remains unclear when dealing 
with imprisonment in default of fine payment,76 it has become clear that 
the imposition of a large fine alone does not implicate the liberty or 
security interest of the individual.77 Accordingly, it is conceivable that a 
court could rectify the problem of an overreaching and weakly justified 
criminal law by invalidating the option of imprisonment, thereby removing 
both the deprivation of liberty or security, and the corresponding need 
for an exacting fundamental justice review. Admittedly, a crime punishable 
by fine alone does not address the problem of continuing stigma by virtue 
of the criminal record, but it must be recognized that depenalization may 
be an appropriate and effective remedy that has yet to be considered even 
though its remedial scope does not intrude as significantly into the 
legislative realm as offence invalidation. 
In fact, in the early part of this decade the Government of Canada 
introduced a “decriminalization” measure to address the claim that the 
offence of marijuana possession did not warrant imposition of the 
criminal law.78 A closer examination of the proposed legislation shows 
that it was not a decriminalization measure but a depenalization measure 
in which possession would simply attract fines under the Contraventions 
Act.79 Although the legislative proposal died on the order paper, it did 
represent a halfway house resolution of the problem of overcriminalization. 
Legislatures and courts should stop thinking of judicial review of criminal 
law as a zero-sum game of validity or invalidity and recognize that a 
potential solution to weakly grounded criminal offences is to remove the 
ultimate sanction of imprisonment. With this in mind, Parliament could 
create new offences without fear of substantive invalidation and the 
courts could mitigate the horror of overcriminalization by ensuring that 
imprisonment is not imposed on a routine basis for everyone who fits 
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within this legislative designation of criminality. To date there has been  
no recognition by the judiciary of the constitutional possibility of 
downscaling Parliament’s choice of punishment for crimes on the margins 
of wrongdoing, and all evaluations of sentencing choices have been 
conducted as part of the gross disproportionality assessment for cruel 
and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter. 
With every crime currently attracting the possibility of imprisonment, 
it is incumbent on the courts to subject every criminal offence to 
fundamental justice review. The breadth of the undertaking underscores 
how important it is for the courts to articulate legal principles in a coherent, 
clear and concise manner if they are to be elevated into principles of 
fundamental justice. What has been missing in the first 25 years of the 
Charter is a coherent statement of the nature and form of fundamental 
principles of justice. The Court is only able to advise us of the following: 
. . . the principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic 
tenets of our legal system. They do not lie in the realm of general public 
policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardians of the 
justice system.  
. . . . . 
 Consequently, the principles of fundamental justice are to be 
found in the basic tenets and principles, not only of our judicial process, 
but also of other components of our legal system. 
 We should not be surprised that many of the principles of 
fundamental justice are procedural in nature. Our common law has 
been a law of remedies and procedures. . . . This is not to say, 
however, that the principles of fundamental justice are limited solely 
to procedural guarantees. Rather, the proper approach to the determination 
of the principles of fundamental justice is quite simply one in which 
“future growth will be based on historical roots”[.]80 
The search for specific principles of fundamental justice which arise 
out of the “basic tenets of the legal system” has proved to be a difficult 
exercise. It may appear helpful for the Court to remind us that section 7 
must be construed having regard to those interests and “against the 
applicable principles and policies that have animated legislative and 
judicial practice in the field”,81 yet problems remain in identifying 
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principles which deserve the label of “fundamental”. Seven years after 
the Motor Vehicle Reference,82 the Court had another opportunity to 
illuminate the principles of fundamental justice. In Rodriguez,83 the Court 
addressed the question of whether the criminal prohibition on assisted 
suicide violated section 7 because it prevented disabled people from 
ending their lives as a release from chronic pain and suffering. The Court 
rejected the argument that respect for human dignity is a principle of 
fundamental justice on the basis that “dignity” is too vague a prescription 
to constitute a principle of fundamental justice. As for the exercise of 
discerning these principles, the Court stated: 
 Discerning the principles of fundamental justice with which 
deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person must accord, in 
order to withstand constitutional scrutiny, is not an easy task. A mere 
common law rule does not suffice to constitute a principle of 
fundamental justice, rather, as the term implies, principles upon which 
there is some consensus that they are vital or fundamental to our societal 
notion of justice are required. Principles of fundamental justice must 
not, however, be so broad as to be no more than vague generalizations 
about what our society considers to be ethical or moral. They must be 
capable of being identified with some precision and applied to situations 
in a manner which yields an understandable result. They must also, in 
my view, be legal principles.84 
Without identifying a specific principle of fundamental justice, the 
Court upheld the prohibition on assisted suicide on the basis that the 
state had two overriding interests: the existence of a perceived consensus 
in favour of an absolute prohibition and the goal of preventing abuse and 
exploitation of vulnerable individuals. At the most basic level of analysis, 
all that happened in this case was a balancing of Rodriguez’s interest 
against the societal interests represented by the law. There did not appear 
to be a clearly stated principle of fundamental justice being debated. 
Two years later, the Court resolved another difficult and sensitive 
rights claim with a similar balancing act. In B. (R.),85 the Court addressed 
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the issue of whether it was violative of section 7 for the state to provide 
a blood transfusion to a child over the religious objections of parents 
who believe that the transfusion of blood is a sacrilege. Although the 
Court was badly divided on the threshold issue of “liberty and security”, 
a majority of the Court concluded that the legislation providing for the 
compelled transfusion was constitutional because the fundamental rights 
of the parents were overridden by the state’s right to protect the life and 
health of children, and because this objective had been pursued in a 
manner consistent with fair process. 
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada introduced this balancing 
approach to section 786 and within two years the Court was saying that 
“[f]undamental justice in our Canadian legal tradition . . . is primarily 
designed to ensure that a fair balance be struck between the interests of 
society and those of its citizens.”87 In fact, numerous pronouncements 
from the Court on the meaning of fundamental justice indicate that the 
search for specific principles has been overtaken by the allure of balancing: 
 The principles of fundamental justice are to be found in “the basic 
tenets of our legal system” . . . “They do not lie in the realm of general 
public policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of 
the justice system” . . . The relevant principles of fundamental justice 
are determined by a contextual approach that “takes into account the 
nature of the decision to be made” . . . The approach is essentially one 
of balancing. As we said in Burns, “[i]t is inherent in the . . . balancing 
process that the outcome may well vary from case to case depending 
on the mix of contextual factors put into the balance.”88 
Balancing of state and individual interests under the fundamental 
justice review was doomed to failure in light of the fact that this balancing 
completely overlapped with the balancing to be done under section 1 of the 
Charter once a violation of any Charter right had been demonstrated.89 
In 2004, the Supreme Court finally laid to rest the overt public policy 
balancing which had left section 7 with an ill-defined and indeterminate 
scope of operation. In the Demers case,90 the Supreme Court of Canada 
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invalidated provisions which effectively prevented an accused who is 
permanently unfit to stand trial from ever being absolutely discharged. 
The Court concluded that the provisions suffered from constitutional 
overbreadth as Parliament did not have the right and authority to 
permanently keep a mentally disordered offender within the social control 
mechanisms of the criminal process when there was no reasonable 
possibility that a trial would ever take place. Beyond overbreadth, it was 
argued that, on balance, the individual’s liberty and security interest 
outweighed Parliament’s goal of public protection. This balancing act 
was rejected by the Court: 
 In making this argument, the respondent misconceives the role 
played by “balancing” in the structure of s. 7 of the Charter. It effectively 
argues that it is a principle of fundamental justice that the correct 
balance be struck between individual and societal interests. However, 
as a majority of this Court made clear in the case of Malmo-Levine . . . 
the “balancing of interests” referred to by McLachlin J. in Cunningham 
is to be taken into consideration by courts only when they are deriving 
or construing the content and scope of the principles of fundamental 
justice themselves. It is not in and of itself a freestanding principle of 
fundamental justice which must be respected if a deprivation of life, 
liberty and security of the person is to be upheld.91 
Both the original and the new formulations of the balancing act are 
confusing and incoherent,92 but the new formulation defies application. 
It is not at all clear what type of balancing would be undertaken  
in “deriving or construing the content and scope of the principles of 
fundamental justice themselves”. Qualifying the generality of a fundamental 
principle by reference to state interests denudes the principle of its essence 
and transforms the principle into a policy. This type of balancing could 
easily lead a court to engage in a more vigorous and extensive form of 
substantive judicial review, but this form of review would be indeterminate 
and would not serve the rule of law. Despite the difficulties in “discerning” 
the “basic tenets” which constitute free-standing principles of fundamental 
justice, the principled approach to section 7 will ultimately be more 
transparent and will facilitate a more meaningful dialogue between 
legislature and judiciary. 
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In order to elevate a principle into a constitutional principle of 
fundamental justice, it is necessary that the asserted principle satisfies 
three criteria: (1) “It must be a legal principle”; (2) There must be a 
“consensus that the . . . principle is ‘vital or fundamental to our societal 
notion of justice’”; and (3) It must be “capable of being identified with 
some degree of precision”.93 The criteria provide a more transparent 
framework of analysis than would state/citizen balancing, but it must 
not be thought that the criteria are so exacting that they would prevent  
the courts from undertaking vigorous and expansive judicial review. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Canada does not seem prepared to 
use “basic tenets” review to increase the scope of substantive review. In 
2003, the Court concluded that the “harm principle” was not a principle of 
fundamental justice because it was not a legal principle and it could not 
be defined with precision.94 As a result, Parliament is not constitutionally 
required to ensure that all criminal offences being enacted are based 
upon conduct harmful to others or to society at large. In 2004, the Court 
concluded that the “best interests of the child” was a legal principle but 
that it was not supported by the type of societal consensus needed to 
elevate a principle to one of fundamental justice.95 As a result, the Court 
upheld the defence of reasonable use of corrective force as a legal 
justification for the parental punishment of spanking. 
One can immediately discern confusion and inconsistency. How can 
one distinguish between a legal and political principle? The “best 
interests of the child” has found expression in family law legislation and 
international conventions, while the “harm principle” has an impressive 
historical pedigree and has found expression in Blackstone, Beccaria, 
Bentham, Canadian government publications and statements of official 
policy.96 What informed the Court’s conclusion that the “best interests of 
the child” has not achieved societal consensus? This seems counter-
intuitive. The Court’s suggestion that no consensus exists because our 
system will incarcerate parents to the detriment of their children is of no 
moment because qualifications or exceptions to a principle do not undercut 
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the consensus underlying the principle. Qualifications will always exist 
as principles are stated at the highest level of generality. 
Whether a court is searching for “basic tenets”, or is balancing state 
versus individual interest, there is no escaping the fact that this is an overtly 
political exercise which will invariably intrude upon policy choices made 
by elected officials. A court may take a constrained or narrow view of 
the basic tenets and avoid the inevitability of substantive review, but the 
opportunity is always present. There is no escaping the fact that the 
principles of fundamental justice truly “reside in the eye of the beholder” 
and thus the only question is when will the judge as beholder feel 
compelled to impose his or her vision on the legislative will of Parliament? 
It appears that the mechanism for triggering judicial interest in 
substantive review lies in the characterization of the section 7 liberty 
interest as one which involves a “fundamental personal decision”. The 
primacy of fundamental personal decisions crystallized in the overlooked 
decision of the Court in Godbout97 in 1997. The Court confronted a 
fundamental justice claim in a non-criminal context. As a condition of 
employment for a municipality, the employee was required to reside 
within its boundaries. The Court invalidated the regulation on the basis 
that it unjustifiably interfered with the “irreducible sphere of personal 
autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently private choices free 
from state interference”.98 Prior to Godbout, the Court had already 
identified that “liberty” under section 7 extends beyond physical restrictions 
on freedom to encompass matters which are “inherently personal such 
that, by their very nature, they implicate basic choices going to the core 
of what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence”.99 The 
Court concluded that, 
if deprivations of the rights to life, liberty and security of the person 
are to survive Charter scrutiny, they must be “fundamentally just” not 
only in terms of the process by which they are carried out but also in 
terms of the ends they seek to achieve, as measured against basic tenets 
of both our judicial system and our legal system more generally.100 
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Freedom to choose one’s place of residency could be “subordinated to 
substantial and compelling collective interests”101 but, in this case, the 
Court rejected a number of different state-sponsored justifications for the 
residency restriction. 
Godbout suggests that the Court will undertake exacting constitutional 
scrutiny when the law interferes with the right to decisions of “fundamental 
personal importance”, and the Court has been confronted with many 
cases which engage personal decisions of this nature. For example, in 
Morgentaler,102 the Court was faced with the right of a woman to decide 
what would be best for her and her unborn child. In B. (R.), 103 the Court 
was faced with the right of parents to choose a medical intervention 
which was consistent with their religious beliefs, and in Rodriguez104 the 
issue concerned the right of a disabled person to end her life just as  
a non-disabled person can do so. While all of these cases engaged 
fundamental, personal decision, invalidation only took place in the 
Morgentaler case, and this invalidation was based primarily on procedural 
concerns and not upon any substantive principle of justice. In the other 
two cases, the Court balanced competing interests and found a state interest 
to override the decision of “fundamental personal importance”. 
It is obvious that the Charter will be trivialized if its guarantees 
apply to personal decisions which are picayune and petty; however, 
creating the category of “fundamental personal decision” does not really 
help in the analysis. First, dividing personal decisions into fundamental 
and non-fundamental is a value-laden exercise beyond the purview of 
judicial understanding. Second, designating a decision as fundamental 
does not assist because the Court does not provide any specific or unique 
methodology for analyzing the constitutionality of state interference with 
this type of fundamental decision. The B. (R.)105 and Rodriguez106 cases 
both show that the designation of a decision as fundamental does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that state interference is unconstitutional. 
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Nonetheless, it is not surprising that the two strongest examples of 
vigorous substantive review, Morgentaler107 and Chaoulli,108 both involve 
fundamental personal decisions about choice of medical treatment. 
Almost everyone will need medical intervention at some point in their 
lives and it did not require a great leap of faith or rationality for the 
Court to embrace the idea that choice of treatment is a fundamental 
decision which cannot be overridden in the absence of “substantial and 
compelling collective interests”. Thus, outside of a few core values which 
have received universal recognition, such as choosing the path of one’s 
course of medical treatment, it is still a highly subjective exercise to 
characterize decisions being made at the periphery as being fundamental 
or trivial. 
The Supreme Court of Canada characterized the decision to smoke 
marijuana for recreational purposes as a “lifestyle [choice]”109 but when 
the substance is used for medicinal purposes, the decision is elevated to 
a fundamental choice going to the “core” of dignity and independence.110 
In fact, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that Parliament would lose the 
constitutional authority to criminalize the use of marijuana, unless it 
constructed a meaningful and effective regime for exempting medical 
users from the reach of the criminal law.111 Not only did protection of a 
fundamental personal decision require Parliament to change its drug 
policy and enact exceptions to its blanket prohibition, but the courts 
have continued to assess and review the merits of the government’s 
medical marijuana program to ensure that its operation is effective and 
does not arbitrarily restrict a patient’s right to choose as a trea tment 
option an illicit and unapproved medicine.112 
Once the liberty interest is characterized as involving a fundamental 
personal decision, it appears that the courts will routinely intrude upon 
the legislative and policy domains. In this context, the “protean pinch 
hitter” that is section 7 of the Charter does appear boundless. For example, 
in the medical marijuana context, the government was first compelled to 
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enact an entirely new regulatory regime, and upon further judicial review,  
it was compelled to find a legal source of marijuana for the hundreds of 
people who had enrolled in the program.113 Consequently the government 
spent millions to contract for a supply of marijuana currently being 
grown in an underground mineshaft in Flin Flon, Manitoba.114 It is 
interesting to note that while the Charter does not contain a free-standing 
right to health care, as is found in the Italian, Venezuelan and South African 
Constitutions,115 substantive review under section 7 has compelled the 
government to grow marijuana for medicine and to facilitate access to 
private health care. There is no question that a court can, and will, review 
the merits of public policy, but it remains unclear when a court will feel 
compelled to do so. The question now to be addressed is to what extent 
have the courts used substantive review to constrain criminal justice policy 
within a set of constitutional minimum standards for the enactment of valid 
criminal law? 
III. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE AND BEYOND 
1. Constitutional Limits on the Content of Criminal Law 
Constitutional norms are always expressed at a high level of generality 
and it is incumbent upon the courts to articulate operational principles to 
guide decision-makers who implement the constitutional norms in concrete 
settings. Operational principles are also formulated at a high level of 
generality and at times they have little substantive content, and primarily 
serve to express a sentiment or aspiration. The principle of fundamental 
justice is one of those empty, but powerful, principles, and with no 
substantive content to guide the courts, most of the work done in the 
past 25 years with respect to fundamental justice and criminal law has 
just replicated, and at times strengthened, the basic principles of liability 
which the courts had been developing at common law. 
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Since the grand opening of substantive review in 1985, there have 
been two types of constitutional claims brought to challenge the content 
of criminal law. The first relates to rule of law principles which set 
certain formal requirements for the legislative description or definition 
of the offence. The second set of claims relate to liability principles which 
set minimum standards for the degree of fault needed to accompany the 
wrongdoing. Over the course of 25 years and dozens of appellate decisions 
reviewing the content of criminal law, there is no question that substantive 
review has produced a number of discernible principles which constrain 
the reach of criminal law. Most of these principles are stated at such a 
high level of generality that they are inherently manipulable. As such, the 
boundaries for the proper content of criminal law are constantly shifting 
from case to case and it remains unclear whether the constitutionalization 
of criminal law has been largely ad hoc or principled. 
(a) The Rule of Law and the Actus Reus 
Considering that it is referred to in the preamble to the Charter, it is 
not surprising that the rule of law has been characterized as a principle of 
fundamental justice.116 The rule of law has many different formulations 
but it is essentially a safeguard against arbitrary lawmaking. The principle 
has little to do with the substantive content of the law and a lot to do 
with the formal content. The principle demands that laws be clear and 
accessible so that law can serve its primary purpose of providing 
behavioural guidance. As Joseph Raz has noted, the rule of law does not 
dictate whether a law will be good or bad, but rather has instrumental 
value to ensure that the law is effective: 
. . . the rule of law is not merely a moral virtue — it is a necessary 
condition for the law to be serving directly any good purpose at all. Of 
course, conformity to the rule of law also enables the law to serve bad 
purposes. That does not mean that it is not a virtue, just as the fact that 
a sharp knife can be used to harm does not show that being sharp is 
not a good-making characteristic of knives. At most it shows that from 
the point of view of the present consideration it is not a moral good. 
Being sharp is an inherent good-making characteristic of knives. A good 
knife, is among other things, a sharp knife. Similarly, conformity to the 
rule of law is an inherent value of laws, indeed it is their most important 
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inherent value. It is the essence of law to guide behaviour through rules 
and courts in charge of their application.117 
The characteristics for enacting “sharp” laws which respect the rule 
of law have been defined in many different ways. Raz includes eight 
principles to define the characteristics: 
1) All laws should be prospective, open and clear; 2) Laws should be 
relatively stable; 3) The making of particular laws (particular legal orders) 
should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules; 4) The 
independence of the judiciary must be respected; 5) The principles of 
natural justice must be observed; 6) The Courts should have review 
powers over the implementation of the other principles; 7) The Courts 
should be easily accessible; 8) The discretion of the crime-preventing 
agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.118 
In a similarly ambitious formulation of the demands of the rule of 
law, Lon Fuller sketches the contours of the principle in his narrative of 
eight reasons why the lawmaking endeavours of his fictional ruler, Rex, 
were destined to fail: 
1) A failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided 
on an ad hoc basis; 2) a failure to publicize, or at least to make 
available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe;  
3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself 
guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, 
since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; 4) a failure 
to make rules understandable; 5) the enactment of contradictory rules 
or 6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected 
parties; 7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject 
cannot orient his action by them; and finally, 8) a failure of congruence 
between the rules as announced and their actual administration.119 
Canadian courts have not adopted all of these wide-ranging 
descriptions of the operation of the rule of law. Some of the principles 
articulated by Raz and Fuller find expression in section 7 fundamental 
justice, while some find expression in common law principles of liability 
and others are simply not part of our constitutional landscape. Our current 
legal landscape is dominated by one primary rule of law concern: that 
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laws clearly describe the prohibited zone of wrongdoing. To that end, 
our courts have focused on the vagueness of the offence definition, and 
overbreadth of the law’s reach — these two related concerns form the 
basis of the minimum standard for the formal content of law demanded 
by principles of fundamental justice. 
The claim that a law is unconstitutionally vague requires a showing 
that the impugned law “permits a ‘standardless sweep’ allowing law 
enforcement officials to pursue their personal predilections”.120 Beyond 
ensuring “that the discretion of those entrusted with law enforcement is 
limited by clear and explicit legislative standards”,121 the rule of law 
requires the law to have sufficient clarity “in order that persons be given 
fair notice of what to avoid”.122 In assessing the vagueness of the law, 
courts are not restricted to the “bare words of the statutory provision, but, 
rather, to the provision as interpreted and applied in judicial decisions”.123 
Despite its widespread application in many cases, the doctrinal 
development of the vagueness doctrine completely undercuts its utility 
as a meaningful constraint on the content of criminal law. Although the 
rationale for the principle focuses on the comprehension and assimilation 
of legal rules by citizens and law enforcement officials, the courts 
continuously ask the question of whether the courts can give “sensible 
meaning”124 to the vague terms of the prohibition. This misplaced focus 
on judicial competency and understanding leads to absurd results which 
bear no relationship to the ultimate question of whether the law is “sharp” 
enough to guide conduct. For example, in 1987, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal was presented with a vagueness challenge to the now-repealed 
offence of “gross indecency”.125 The Criminal Code126
 
did not provide 
any further definitional guidance and the Court looked to prior judicial 
interpretations to determine whether the courts have given the expression 
“gross indecency” a sensible meaning. The Court concluded that the 
                                                                                                            
120
 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1157 (S.C.C.).  
121
 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1152 (S.C.C.). 
122
 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1152 (S.C.C.). 
123
 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1157 (S.C.C.). 
124
 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1128, 1156-57, 1160, 1161 (S.C.C.). 
125
 R. v. LeBeau; R. v. Lofthouse, [1988] O.J. No. 51, 41 C.C.C. (3d) 163 (Ont. C.A.). 
126
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) DONE NOTHING WRONG 475 
offence was not unconstitutionally vague as the courts had given the 
offence sensible meaning with the test of whether the conduct in question 
was “a marked departure from decent conduct expected of average 
Canadians in the circumstances”.127 
Surely, the judicial construction and elaboration of the definition  
of gross indecency is meaningless in terms of guiding conduct and 
constraining official discretion. It is actually not that different from the 
often-condemned form of Nazi legality which prohibited any conduct 
“deserving of penalty according to the fundamental conceptions of a 
penal law and sound popular feeling”.128 There is little doubt that the 
vagueness doctrine sets a minimum standard for valid law, but the standard 
is largely symbolic or rhetorical. Vagueness challenges have been one 
of the most common section 7 challenges being raised in courts of law, 
but in 25 years there has not been a single invalidation of a criminal 
offence on the basis of insufficient clarity.129 
Despite two bold invalidations by the Court,130 the overbreadth 
doctrine has not fared much better than the vagueness doctrine. As with 
vagueness, the courts have had little difficulty outlining the test to be 
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applied to assess whether the breadth of the law extends far beyond the 
objectives behind the law: 
 Overbreadth analysis looks at the means chosen by the state in 
relation to its purpose. In considering whether a legislative provision is 
over broad, a court must ask the question: are those means necessary 
to achieve the State objective? If the State, in pursuing a legitimate 
objective, uses means which are broader than is necessary to accomplish 
that objective, the principles of fundamental justice will be violated 
because the individual’s rights will have been limited for no reason. 
The effect of overbreadth is that in some applications the law is arbitrary 
or disproportionate. 
 Reviewing legislation for overbreadth as a principle of fundamental 
justice is simply an example of the balancing of the State interest against 
that of the individual ... 
 In analyzing a statutory provision to determine if it is overbroad,  
a measure of deference must be paid to the means selected by the 
legislature. While the courts have a constitutional duty to ensure that 
legislation conforms with the Charter, legislatures must have the power 
to make policy choices. A court should not interfere with legislation 
merely because a judge might have chosen a different means of 
accomplishing the objective if he or she had been the legislator.131 
Overbreadth essentially requires the court to determine if the 
lawmakers have “overshot the mark”132 in formulating the terms and 
conditions of a criminal offence. 
There is significant overlap between vagueness and overbreadth, 
and these two principles only permit indirect review of the merits of law 
as they are predicated on only reviewing the means chosen to achieve 
legislative ends. The ends or objectives of legislation are not questioned 
as part of this review process. Yet it is reasonable to assume that if 
Parliament has confusion over the objectives being sought there is a 
good chance that some of this confusion will carry over to the drafting 
of an ill-defined and general law. 
Overbreadth has enormous potential to act as a brake on hastily 
conceived criminal law. This potential has yet to be realized but the 
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Demers133 and Chaoulli134 cases may signal that overbreadth will be 
strengthened and nourished as the courts continue to develop their 
conception of an “arbitrary law”. Vagueness and overbreadth are just 
specific manifestations of the larger constitutional vice of “arbitrariness”, 
and there is some indication that the courts are willing to undertake a 
more exacting assessment of whether a law is arbitrary. In its original 
formulation in Rodriguez,135 the test for arbitrariness was as follows: 
 Where the deprivation of the right in question does little or nothing 
to enhance the state’s interest (whatever it may be), it seems to me that 
a breach of fundamental justice will be made out, as the individual’s 
rights will have been deprived for no valid purpose.136 
On its face, this test allows a court to invalidate a law which is 
ineffective in achieving its stated purpose, but the Supreme Court  
has never explicitly suggested that this is the type of substantive review 
contemplated by the rule of law. In Rodriguez,137 the Court did not find 
the prohibition on assisted suicide to be unconstitutional and until the 
Demers138 and Chaoulli139 cases were decided, the arbitrariness doctrine 
seemed moribund. 
Although the court was badly divided in Chaoulli140 on the ultimate 
assessment of the arbitrariness of prohibiting private health care insurance, 
three members of the court were fairly clear in articulating the test for an 
arbitrary law and the need to review and assess the government’s policy 
choices: 
 It is a well-recognized principle of fundamental justice that laws 
should not be arbitrary. . . . The state is not entitled to arbitrarily limit 
its citizens’ right to life, liberty and security of the person. 
 A law is arbitrary where “it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent 
with, the objective that lies behind [it]”. To determine whether this is 
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the case, it is necessary to consider the state interest and societal 
concerns that the provision is meant to reflect. . . . 
. . . . . 
 The government argues that the interference with security of the 
person caused by denying people the right to purchase private health 
insurance is necessary to providing effective health care under the 
public health system. 
. . . . . 
 When we look to the evidence rather than to assumptions, the 
connection between prohibiting private insurance and maintaining 
quality public health care vanishes. . . . The government contends 
that this is necessary in order to preserve the public health system. The 
evidence, however, belies that contention.141 
As has been mentioned, the vigorous substantive review undertaken 
in Chaoulli142 may be an exception to the more common practice of 
limited review in light of the medical urgency and necessity underlying 
the case. It may also be a signal for a willingness to undertake a more 
exacting review for arbitrariness. Just three years earlier, the Supreme 
Court showed a willingness to expand the arbitrariness review by 
constructing a “gross disproportionality” test for arbitrariness which 
requires a court to assess and balance the benefits and objectives of the 
law against the harms the law may cause in its implementation.143 A law 
will be arbitrary “if the use of the criminal law were shown . . . to be grossly 
disproportionate in its effects on accused persons, when considered in 
light of the [state] objective . . . the prohibition would be contrary to 
fundamental justice . . .”.144 It is somewhat unclear if this test was 
intended to supplement or replace the Rodriguez145 test for arbitrariness, 
but in light of the Supreme Court reliance upon the Rodriguez test in 
Chaoulli, it is most likely that the gross disproportionality test is designed 
to supplement the traditional test. In this way, it expands upon the scope 
of substantive review by allowing the Court not only to assess the 
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effectiveness of the means chosen to achieve a policy objective, but also 
to assess whether or not the objective was outweighed by any harmful 
side-effects created by the enactment of the law. This balancing is not a 
far cry from an outright assessment of merits of the law on a strictly 
utilitarian premise. 
The review for arbitrariness and overbreadth may present an open 
invitation for substantive review when the Court is so inclined. Professor 
Hogg has noted that overbreadth: 
. . . raises some practical and theoretical difficulties, and confers an 
exceedingly discretionary power of review on the Court. The doctrine 
requires that the terms of a law be no broader than is necessary to 
accomplish the purpose of the law. But the purpose of the law is a judicial 
construct, which can be defined widely or narrowly as the reviewing 
court sees fit. In [Heywood146] for example, Cory J. who wrote for the 
majority, defined the purpose of the law as being for the protection of 
children, while Gonthier J., who wrote for the dissenting minority, 
defined the purpose of the law as being for the protection of adults as 
well as children . . . Even if agreement could be reached on the 
purpose of the law, the question of whether the terms of the law are no 
broader than is needed to carry out the purpose raises a host of 
interpretive, policy and empirical questions . . . It must be recognized 
. . . that a judge who disapproves of a law will always be able to find 
that it is overbroad.147 
The enormous potential for substantive review is heightened by the 
approved methodology of using “reasonable hypotheticals” in assessing 
whether a provision is arbitrary or overly broad. The Supreme Court  
has constantly insisted that constitutional issues not be argued in an 
“evidentiary vacuum” and that the challenge be fully animated by the 
relevant adjudicative and legislative facts.148 However, the Court has 
also permitted challenges to laws to proceed on the basis of speculation 
and hypothesis relating to how the law could violate Charter rights so 
long as the hypotheticals are not “far-fetched”, “remote” or “marginally 
imaginable”.149 The reasonable hypothetical methodology was first used 
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in demonstrating that a mandatory minimum sentence could constitute a 
cruel and unusual punishment as applied to a hypothetical accused.150 It 
has since been applied to other section 7 claims relating to full answer 
and defence and overbreadth (but not to vagueness challenges).151 
There is little doubt that this methodology facilitates substantive 
review as it obviates the need for a person charged with a crime to show 
that the law applies in an arbitrary manner to his or her situation. It is 
sufficient to show that the law could apply to a hypothetical offender in 
a realistic situation even though there is no empirical data or other evidence 
to show that this situation ever has, or will ever, occur. In criticizing the 
Supreme Court for using reasonable hypotheticals in the assessment of 
an overbreadth claim, Professor Hogg has noted: 
. . . the majority’s analysis is based entirely on hypothetical cases 
involving the most innocent possible offenders. This mode of reasoning 
is a very powerful tool of judicial review, since there must be few laws 
indeed in which it would not be possible to design a hypothetical case 
(disregarding the realities of the police and prosecutorial discretion) 
that is caught by the law although it falls outside the apparent purpose 
of the law.152 
In conclusion, rule of law principles exert an enormous gravitational 
pull on the construction and formulation of the actus reus. The rule of 
law requires clarity of expression and a rational connection between the 
objective and the means chosen to achieve the objective. A court can 
invalidate a law which overshoots the mark, but it does not appear that it 
can invalidate a law that misses the mark entirely. In the next section, I 
will return to the issue of an outright challenge to the asserted wrongfulness 
of the actus reus, as it is this type of challenge which directly and bluntly 
engages review of merits, but in completing the outline of the current 
landscape, I must first discuss the constitutional minimum standards 
which govern the principles of fault or criminal liability. 
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(b) The Constitutionalization of Mens Rea 
As with the rule of law, there are many different formulations of the 
principles governing criminal liability. In the early 17th century, Lord Coke 
formulated the famous maxim: “Actus not facit reus nisi mens sit rea”153 
(the act is not criminal unless the mind is criminal), and for centuries 
theorists and jurists have struggled with defining the requisite level of 
fault needed to make the commission of wrongdoing a blameworthy act. 
The Motor Vehicle Reference154 constitutionalized the principle with its 
admonishment that imprisonment cannot be imposed in the absence of 
fault, but fault is an amorphous concept and the Motor Vehicle principle 
provides little guidance in terms of establishing minimum standards for 
imposing criminal liability. 
Professor Fletcher sees the evolution of the Coke maxim as manifesting 
itself in the following principles of liability: 
1. Every criminal offence presupposes a voluntary human act. 
2. Every criminal offence includes a dimension of wrongdoing. 
3. Claims of justification negate wrongdoing. 
4. Every punishable act presupposes blameworthy commission of the 
elements of the offence. 
5. Blameworthy commission requires at least negligent conduct with 
respect to every element of the offence. 
6. Intentional, knowing, and reckless actions are worse than negligent 
conduct with respect to the elements of the offence. 
7. Excused conduct is not blameworthy. 
8. Reasonable mistakes are not blameworthy. 
9. Subjective perceptions alone cannot justify conduct. 
10. Self-defence is available only against unjustified attacks.155 
Similarly, in the 2007 edition of Principles of Criminal Law, Colvin 
and Anand extract 16 principles which have emerged under the Charter 
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in relation to criminal culpability, including “the fault principle, the  
fair warning principle, the contemporaneity principle, the voluntariness 
principle, the cognitive capacity principle, the moral voluntariness principle, 
and the symmetry principle”.156 Some of the principles formulated  
by Fletcher and Colvin/Anand find expression in common law and 
constitutional principles while others are more honoured in the breach. 
In actuality, the courts have been fairly modest and circumspect in 
articulating the principles of fault demanded by the Constitution. 
In retrospect, the Motor Vehicle Reference157 did not effect a significant 
change in the legal landscape. First, substantive review of the principles 
of liability concerned issues which historically have been within the 
expertise of the judiciary. Mens rea, actus reus, excuses and justifications 
have all been developed primarily within the context of court decisions. 
Parliament has never provided much guidance with respect to the fault 
requirements of a criminal offence, preferring to leave this issue for 
judicial development. Consequently, judicial review for a constitutionally 
sound minimum level of fault simply echoes the role and function of 
common law courts for the past few hundred years. Thus, the Motor 
Vehicle Reference did not actually signal the beginning of a rigorous 
form of constitutional review which would incidentally trench upon 
Parliament’s policy choices — it was just a reflection of the Court already 
engaged in a very familiar and comfortable discourse. 
Second, the articulation of the principle of the fundamental justice 
— no imprisonment without fault — may have been full of sound and fury 
signifying nothing. Since the invalidation of the constructive homicide 
provisions in the late 1980s,158 the courts have found few occasions to 
invalidate offences on the basis that they contain a constitutionally deficient 
level of fault. In the constructive homicide cases, the Court incrementally 
concluded that the offence of murder must contain an element of subjective 
foresight of death, but little guidance is provided as to when subjective 
fault will be required for other offences. The Court’s only concrete 
stipulation is that a subjective form of mens rea is constitutionally 
required only when the offence contains a high degree of stigma and is 
subject to a high level of punishment. Accordingly, courts dismissed 
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virtually every challenge demanding subjective fault as a constitutional 
minimum standard on the basis that the penalty and stigma associated 
with the crime was not very severe.159 Of course, without a standard for 
measuring the severity of sanction this conclusion is meaningless. Within 
six years of the constructive murder invalidations, the Court also concluded 
that the offence of manslaughter did not have a sufficiently high level  
of stigma and punishment to trigger the substantive requirements of 
fundamental justice respecting the minimum level of fault.160 If manslaughter 
is not a stigmatizing classification with a high penalty (maximum life) 
then it is unlikely that any other criminal offence will ever trigger the 
constitutional requirement of subjective fault. 
So it remains unclear when objective versus subjective liability will 
be required, and it also remains unclear whether the “symmetry principle” 
demands that there be an element of fault, either objective or subjective, 
attaching to every element of the actus reus. In the Creighton161 case, the 
Court stated that: 
I agree that as a general rule the mens rea of the offence relates to the 
consequences prohibited by the offence . . . Yet our criminal law 
contains important exceptions to this ideal of perfect symmetry. The 
presence of these exceptions suggests that the rule of symmetry is just 
that — a rule — to which there are exceptions. If this is so, then the 
rule cannot be elevated to the status of a principle of fundamental 
justice which must, by definition, have universal application. 
 It is important to distinguish between criminal law theory, which 
seeks the ideal of absolute symmetry between actus reus and mens 
rea, and the constitutional requirements of the Charter.162 
Based upon this reasoning, the Supreme Court in Creighton163 was 
able to conclude that the mens rea for unlawful act manslaughter only 
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required objective foreseeability of bodily harm. Objective liability was 
justified because “the stigma attached to manslaughter is an appropriate 
stigma”,164 and the mens rea did not need to extend to the stipulated 
consequence of death because the symmetry principle was not elevated 
to a principle of fundamental justice. Ultimately, the underlying thrust 
of this judgment is to undercut the creation of minimum standards of 
fault and leave the determination to an ad hoc assessment of whether 
there exist good policy reasons for departing from common law principles 
for assessing fault. 
After a flurry of mens rea cases, it is clear that Parliament will never 
be able to combine absolute liability with imprisonment in the future, 
nor will it be able to create a crime of negligent murder. These were 
significant developments in the short history of Charter adjudication in 
Canada, but in a practical sense the substantive principle of fault-based 
criminality has been restricted to invalidating an archaic relic (constructive 
murder) and prohibiting a form of legislation which rarely occurs 
(combining absolute liability with imprisonment). Beyond these two clear 
developments, the rules and principles governing fault are few in number 
and modest in scope. 
As a bedrock principle, it has been established as a constitutional 
principle that all acts must be voluntary.165 Although technically an actus 
reus and not a mens rea principle, regardless of the classification, the 
utility of this cornerstone principle as a minimum standard of fault is 
somewhat undercut by common law developments in which a skeptical 
Supreme Court has reversed the onus of proof for a claim of involuntariness 
(“the last refuge of a scoundrel”).166 Beyond the voluntariness principle, 
the Supreme Court has expressed support for four basic principles of 
fault. This modest expression of principles governing minimum standards 
is formulated differently from case to case, but the basic components 
find expression in the following statements made by the Court: 
1. Punishment and stigma “must be proportionate to the . . . 
blameworthiness of the offender”. 
2. “[C]riminal liability for a particular result is not justified except where 
the actor possesses a culpable mental state in respect of that result.” 
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3. “Those causing harm intentionally [should] be punished more severely 
than those causing harm unintentionally.” 
4. “[T]here must be an element of personal fault in regard to a culpable 
aspect of the actus reus, but not necessarily in regard to each and 
every element of the actus reus.”167 
Of course, these principles do not come close to providing guidance 
on crucial questions like when is a “culpable mental state in respect of 
that result” to be assessed subjectively or objectively, or what are the 
criteria to be employed for the classification of an actus reus component 
as “culpable”? At the highest level of abstraction, the courts uniformly 
pay homage to the constitutional requirement of fault, but at the level of 
implementation and application, the rules and principles do not dictate 
uniform and consistent results. This has always been the case at common 
law with respect to mens rea and it remains true as the interpretation of 
mens rea still appears haphazard and unprincipled despite the presence 
of section 7 of the Charter. In recent years, the Supreme Court has ruled 
that the mens rea for counselling an offence never committed can be 
lowered from intent to recklessness,168 and that the mens rea for party 
liability can be lowered from purpose to intent (oddly defined as mere 
knowledge).169 These cases make little sense in terms of statutory 
interpretation and the Court’s act of interpretation seems to bear no 
relationship to the modest principles articulated in constitutional cases. 
Although there remains some doubt as to the constitutional minimum 
standard for actus reus and mens rea elements, if a court concludes that 
a certain element is an essential element, then the presumption of innocence 
under section 11(d) of the Charter has a role to play in substantive 
review. For the most part, the presumption of innocence is used to review 
the constitutionality of statutory provisions which impose an evidentiary 
or persuasive burden upon the accused. Certain elements of crime, 
usually mens rea elements, present practical problems of proof for the 
Crown. To ease the evidentiary and persuasive burdens placed on the 
Crown, Parliament will often create a statutory presumption allowing a 
court to presume that the problematic element has been proved by inference 
from another easily proved fact. Unless there is a strong rational connection 
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between the proved fact and the presumed fact, there is a good chance 
that the presumption will be invalidated. If, under the operation of the 
presumption “it would be possible for a conviction to occur despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt”, 170 then the provision cannot stand. 
If all the accused is required to do is cast some doubt on the inference 
from proved to presumed fact (an evidentiary burden), then the presumption 
will usually be upheld or saved by operation of section 1.171 It is much 
more difficult to uphold a persuasive burden under which the accused 
must disprove on a balance of probabilities the link between proved and 
presumed facts. Persuasive burdens will usually require justification 
under section 1.172 The presumption of innocence operates to ensure that 
in the ordinary course it will be incumbent upon the Crown to prove all 
essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and this obligation extends 
to essential elements of a defence and not just the actus reus and mens rea 
elements.173 
The presumption of innocence not only constrains Parliamentary 
choices to utilize evidentiary presumptions, but also operates to prevent 
Parliament from eliminating an essential element altogether, or substituting 
some other element for proof of the essential one. For example, the crime 
of constructive murder operated by eliminating the essential element of 
foresight of death and replaced this element with four enumerated acts 
— i.e., using a firearm, causing harm for facilitating escape, administering 
a stupefying thing and stopping breath. The Supreme Court recognized 
that section 11(d) of the Charter had a role to play above and beyond the 
role played by section 7 in conducting substantive review. Justice Lamer 
(as he then was) stated: 
 Finally, the legislature, rather than simply eliminating any need to 
prove the essential element, may substitute proof of a different element. 
In my view, this will be constitutionally valid only if upon proof 
beyond reasonable doubt of the substituted element it would be 
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unreasonable for the trier of fact not to be satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the existence of the essential element. If the trier of fact may 
have a reasonable doubt as to the essential element notwithstanding 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the substituted element, then the 
substitution infringes ss. 7 and 11(d).174 
There may be some uncertainty as to whether an element of an 
offence is an essential element required by the principles of fundamental 
justice, but if the element is deemed essential by virtue of statutory or 
constitutional interpretation, then the courts are quite vigilant in ensuring 
that Parliament does not eliminate the element through clever drafting and 
evidentiary presumptions. The bottom line is that a “statutory presumption 
will be valid if the proof of the substituted fact leads inexorably to the 
proof of the other”,175 and this principle imposes significant constraints 
on Parliament’s ability to tinker with statutory definitions of crime in 
order to ease the burden of prosecution. 
The extension of the presumption of innocence to safeguard essential 
elements of a defence foreshadowed the judicial enterprise of creating 
minimum standards for the invocation of exculpatory defences. Fault is 
comprised of mens rea and the absence of exculpatory defences, and the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the principles of fundamental justice 
have relevance for the elucidation of the essential elements of an excuse 
or justification. For example, in 1991, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the regulatory offence of misleading advertising was a strict liability 
offence allowing for a defence of due diligence.176 However, the 
regulatory regime required that the accused make a retraction as a pre-
condition for avoiding conviction. The Court invalidated the obligation 
of retracting as it undercut the defence of due diligence. One could have 
been duly diligent before the fact of the offence and a retraction after the 
fact has nothing to do with conduct leading to the offence. 
More significantly, in 2001, the Supreme Court held that “moral 
involuntariness” (as opposed to “moral blamelessness”) was a principle 
of fundamental justice,177 and with it created a constitutional minimum 
standard for all defences in the nature of an excuse. In 1984, the Supreme 
Court of Canada characterized the common law defence of necessity as 
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an excuse based upon moral involuntariness.178 An act will be excused 
when it was “realistically unavoidable” because it was “remorselessly 
compelled by normal human instincts”.179 In a physical sense, the act is 
voluntary but in a moral sense the actor must be excused because in the 
circumstances of necessity, or any other disabling circumstance, he or 
she was prevented from exercising real choice. In 2001, the Court 
elevated this common law principle to a constitutional principle and, as 
a result, invalidated the statutory defence of duress because the defence 
set preconditions for operation of the defence which bore no rational 
relationship with the overriding consideration of assessing moral 
involuntariness.180 
Finally, the Supreme Court has also strengthened the operation of 
statutory defences by requiring that the conditions of the defence are not 
arbitrary. In Morgentaler,181 substantive review of the abortion offence 
quickly was transformed into procedural review as the Court recognized 
that the statutory exemptions for obtaining a lawful abortion were 
procedurally flawed. In the course of invalidating the obstacle course 
enacted for securing a lawful abortion, the Court held that the exculpatory 
conditions of a statutory defence (or exemption) must be conditions which 
all accused persons can effectively meet: 
One of the basic tenets of our system of criminal justice is that, when 
Parliament creates a defence to a criminal charge, the defence should 
not be illusory or so difficult to attain as to be practically illusory. The 
criminal law is a very special form of governmental regulation, for it 
seeks to express our society’s collective disapprobation of certain acts 
or omissions. When a defence is provided, especially a specifically-
tailored defence to a particular charge, it is because the legislator has 
determined that the disapprobation of society is not warranted when 
the conditions of the defence are met. 
. . . . . 
Parliament must be given room to design an appropriate administrative 
and procedural structure for bringing into operation a particular defence 
to criminal liability. But if that structure is so “manifestly unfair, having 
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regard to the decisions it is called upon to make, as to violate the 
principles of fundamental justice”, that structure must be struck down.182 
The “illusory defence” principle will compel a court to review the 
effectiveness of a regulatory regime if this regime is designed to exempt 
people from the ordinary operation of the law. Perhaps the courts are  
not as concerned with assessing the merits and practical efficacy of a 
statutory defence because the courts continue to exercise a lawmaking 
function under section 8(3) of the Criminal Code183 with respect to the 
development of defences. Nonetheless, the type of review contemplated 
by the Morgentaler184 illusory defence claim is a significant intrusion into 
the legislative domain. The question we now turn to is whether substantive 
review can be expanded beyond the invalidation of ineffective defences 
to the invalidation of ineffective offences which do not serve the public 
interest. 
2. The Wrongfulness of the Actus Reus Is a Sacred Cow 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he efficacy of a law, or lack 
thereof, is not relevant to Parliament’s ability to enact it under the 
division of powers analysis.”185 It appears that the ineffectiveness of a 
legislative initiative is also not relevant under the Charter analysis; 
however, a utilitarian assessment of the effectiveness of a law could be 
relevant to the balancing for arbitrariness and gross disproportionality 
under section 7 and the balancing of state versus individual interest under 
section 1. To date, there has been little discussion of the relevance of 
efficacy of law primarily because this is the type of claim which takes 
time to present itself ripe for challenge. It may take decades from the 
time of enactment to discover through the collection of social science 
evidence that the legislation is not effectively serving its objective, and 
for this reason it is not surprising that few challenges have been predicated 
on an empirical assessment of the operation of the law. 
A more fundamental challenge relates to the claim that the law does 
not serve a valid purpose from the outset. Unlike an efficacy claim, this 
claim does not track future operation of the law but is predicated on the 
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assertion that Parliament did not have a sound and compelling reason to 
designate certain conduct as criminal at the time of enactment. In essence, 
the claim is being made to challenge the presumed wrongfulness of the 
legislative designation of the actus reus — it is a claim that the actus 
reus does not contain sufficient elements to state a “coherent moral 
imperative”.186 
A claim of this nature was brought in relation to the offence of 
possession of marijuana.187 In a nutshell, a voluminous evidentiary record 
was compiled to demonstrate that there is no hard evidence to prove that 
marijuana use leads to significant harm to the user, to others and to 
society at large. It was argued that the “harm principle” is a principle of 
fundamental justice and a criminal offence must be invalidated if it is 
shown that the impugned conduct does not lead to harm to others 
(including societal harm). The Supreme Court rejected this argument 
and the reasons for judgment display a confused and incoherent theoretical 
vision of the role of criminal law in modern society. 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Caine,188 Clay189 and 
Malmo-Levine190 has received extensive academic commentary191 and I 
will not spend much time dissecting the case and commentary. The 
problem I wish to discuss extends far beyond the question of the proper 
political approach to marijuana use, or the relevance and importance of 
the rejected “harm principle”. In my view, the marijuana cases clearly 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court views the legislative designation of 
wrongful conduct to be a sacred cow beyond challenge. Although some 
room to challenge is left with the arbitrary and overbreadth claims, this 
case simply gives Parliament carte blanche in its criminal law power 
with absolutely no recognition that any carte blanche grant of power 
will eventually come back to haunt the grantor. 
In the context of obscenity and freedom of expression, the Supreme 
Court noted that the lawmaker is entitled to enact criminal law if there is 
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a “reasoned apprehension of harm”.192 The standard is low and it is 
inconceivable that lawmakers could not show a reasonable apprehension 
of harm as the basis for enacting most criminal offences. Technically, 
this statement was made in the assessment of whether obscenity 
prohibitions were a section 1 reasonable limit on freedom of expression, 
and some review of the merits and objectives of the law will be necessary 
to determine whether a violation of free expression can be justified. In the 
marijuana cases, it was argued that this low threshold test of a reasonable 
apprehension of harm should also be employed as a constitutional 
barometer of whether the enactment of a law is in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice. 
The lower courts accepted that the “harm principle” was a principle 
of fundamental justice,193 but on any formulation of this principle, the 
courts concluded that there was sufficient harm associated with the use 
of marijuana to satisfy the dictates of the principle. Surprisingly, the 
Supreme Court of Canada did not resolve the challenge solely on the basis 
that there did exist reasonable evidence of harm, but took the additional 
step of rejecting the harm principle for not being a legal principle for 
which a societal consensus exists. The Court concluded that Parliament 
is not restricted to the enactment of criminal laws which prevent harm to 
others, and that the goals and objectives of criminal law are multi-faceted 
and diverse. In addition, Parliament need not justify its decision to 
criminalize on the basis of any of these diverse objectives. At its essence, 
these cases release the state from any meaningful obligation to justify  
its criminal law power. While this is consistent with the recognized 
proposition that a prosecutor need not justify his or her decision to 
prosecute a particular charge,194 when both propositions are combined 
you are left with a legislative and executive power which is painfully 
unaccountable. 
The harm principle was rejected as a principle of fundamental 
justice primarily because the Court believed it was not a recognized 
legal principle since time immemorial. This cannot mean that a principle 
can only be a fundamental one if it is found in judicial decisions of 
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ancient vintage. Mens rea has become constitutionalized yet as recently 
as 1957, the Supreme Court of Canada struggled with the question of 
whether the offence of possession of a narcotic required proof that the 
accused knew he or she was in possession of a drug.195 Mens rea evolved 
slowly over centuries and absolute liability had a role to play for many 
centuries.196 In addition, restricting the principles to those expressed in 
judicial pronouncements is myopic and inconsistent with the requirement 
that the principle be supported by a societal consensus. Judicial decisions 
are not a proxy for societal consensus and judicial decisions should be 
animated by the entire legal topography, including scholarship, government 
reports and empirical studies. 
Political theory has a role to play in constitutional adjudication. As 
Fletcher has noted, “the political theory we choose will invariably shape 
our answers to innumerable questions about what should be punished, 
when nominal violations are justified and when wrongdoing should be 
excused”.197 It is puzzling that the Supreme Court did not acknowledge 
the significance of J.S. Mill, Bentham and Beccaria in assessing whether 
the harm principle was fundamental. Ultimately, the political theories 
supporting constraints and limits on the enactment of criminal law 
became reflected in contemporary scholarship, law commission reports 
and government reports.198 This movement from theory to practice 
provides the Court with the type of evidence needed to show societal 
consensus. Ultimately, the Court ignored the fact that  
apart from the libertarians and communists at the extremes, the vast 
majority of us are unreflective liberals. We are suspicious of common 
law crimes and accept at face value Mill’s principle that the state 
should punish only to prevent harm, and we take these two positions to 
be an adequate theoretical foundation for our work.199 
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Without engaging the nuances of political theory, it is hard to argue 
against the political ascendancy of liberalism, however conceived, in the 
modern era. A prominent version of liberal political theory provides 
clear support for limiting the state’s power of criminalization: 
Liberalism is not one political doctrine but a family of doctrines — a 
kind of “faith” with many rival denominations. We can distinguish 
two prominent types of liberalism in terms of how they conceive of 
liberty: the first conceives of it in Lockean terms, the second conceives 
of it in more Rousseauian terms. The Lockeans focus on the danger to 
liberty coming from the power of the state, and thus advocate minimal 
government and certain liberties (or rights) of subjects (such as habeas 
corpus and the right to bail); such Lockeans include Montesquieu, 
Constant, Humboldt, and many American revolutionaries. Philosophers 
such as J.S. Mill, H.L.A. Hart and Joel Feinberg also work within this 
tradition when they insist that a liberal society can, by and large, only 
admit laws sanctioned by the “harm principle”, which require that the 
state can only interfere with behavior that either harms, or gives offence, 
to people other than the person interfered with.200 
I suggest that this notion of liberalism is so deeply rooted we all 
assume that lawmakers will only activate the criminal law to prevent 
harm to others and society at large, though we often disagree on the 
definition of harm and the proof of its existence. Although the Supreme 
Court appears to reject this basic component of liberalism by rejecting 
the harm principle as a principle of fundamental justice, it then embraces 
another component of liberalism by rejecting “legal moralism” as a basis 
for enacting criminal law. Joel Feinberg describes this notion as follows: 
The liberal does not urge that the legislators of criminal law be 
unconcerned with “a man’s morals”. Indeed, everything about a 
person that the criminal law should be concerned with is included in 
this morals. But not everything in a person’s morals should be the 
concern of the law, only his disposition to violate the rights of other 
parties. He may be morally blameworthy for his beliefs and desires, 
his taboo infractions, his tastes, his harmless exploitations, and other 
free-floating evils, but these moral judgments are not the business of 
the criminal law.201 
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Similarly, the Court notes that “the objective of maintaining 
conventional standards of propriety, independently of any harm to society, 
is no longer justified in light of the values of individual liberty which 
underlie the Charter.”202 
It appears that the Court does not have a coherent theoretical vision 
of the role of criminal law, but ultimately the Court is a political 
institution and an accusation that the Court lacks a coherent philosophical 
framework is not that devastating. The accusation becomes more serious 
when there is an incoherence between what the Court says and what the 
Court does. Concluding that the harm principle is not a legal principle 
makes little sense when the harm principle is a fundamental principle of 
statutory construction. Under the guise of strict construction, the Supreme 
Court has been inspired by the harm principle to effect significant 
changes in the scope of criminal offences.203 The Court has said that it 
must impose limitations on the reach of the criminal law “in order to 
avoid a weakening of the authority of the criminal law by its application 
to trifles”.204 In addition, the doctrine of “de minimis”, which is simply a 
restatement of the harm principle, has received some recognition by the 
Court.205 
The most telling example of internal incoherence within the Court’s 
theoretical framework is to contrast its rejection of the harm principle as 
a legal principle in 2003 with its reconstruction of the concept of 
indecency in 2005. In two companion cases, Kouri and Labaye,206 the 
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether or not “sex clubs” in 
Montreal constituted bawdy houses for the purpose of indecency. Prior 
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to this sex club case, the Supreme Court had recently grappled with the 
concept of indecency in clubs and public spaces on three other occasions, 
and the results were not entirely consistent or clear.207 In Kouri and 
Labaye, the Court decided to change the rules of engagement and it 
rejected the community standards test for indecency it had applied in the 
previous cases. The Court formulated a new test inspired and animated 
by the harm principle: 
 The first step is to generically describe the type of harm targeted 
by the concept of indecent conduct under the Criminal Code. In Butler 
at p. 485 and Little Sisters at para. 59, this was described as “conduct 
which society formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper 
functioning”. 
 Two general requirements emerge from this description of the 
harm required for criminal indecency. First, the words “formally 
recognize” suggest that the harm must be grounded in norms which 
our society has recognized in its Constitution or similar fundamental 
laws. This means that the inquiry is not based on individual notions of 
harm, nor on the teachings of a particular ideology, but on what 
society, through its laws and institutions, has recognized as essential to 
its proper functioning. Second, the harm must be serious in degree. It 
must not only detract from proper societal functioning but must be 
incompatible with it. 
. . . . . 
 Three types of harm have thus far emerged from the jurisprudence 
as being capable of supporting a finding of indecency: (1) harm to 
those whose autonomy and liberty may be restricted by being confronted 
with inappropriate conduct; (2) harm to society by predisposing others 
to anti-social conduct; and (3) harm to individuals participating in the 
conduct.208 
(emphasis in original omitted) 
The Court imposed a heavy, if not impossible, burden of proof upon 
the trial prosecutor. Above and beyond the actus reus elements needed to 
prove the crime of keeping a bawdy house, the Crown is now required  
to prove the additional element of showing that the activities taking place 
in the house were harmful to the participants, other people or society at 
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large. Ironically, the manner in which a prosecutor must prove indecency 
is not much different than the way in which Parliament would be 
required to prove the merits of enacting the offence if called upon to do 
so in an expanded form of substantive review of the actus reus. To prove 
that a bawdy house was kept for indecent purposes, the Crown must 
now present evidence akin to legislative facts: 
 Incompatibility with the proper functioning of society is more 
than a test of tolerance. The question is not what individuals or the 
community think about the conduct, but whether permitting it engages 
a harm that threatens the basic functioning of our society. This ensures 
in part that the harm be related to a formally recognized value, at step 
one. But beyond this it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the conduct, not only by its nature but also in degree, rises to the level 
of threatening the proper functioning of our society. 
 Whether it does so must be determined by reference to the values 
engaged by the particular kind of harm at stake. If the harm is based on the 
threat to autonomy and liberty arising from unwanted confrontation by a 
particular kind of sexual conduct, for example, the Crown must establish a 
real risk that the way people live will be significantly and adversely 
affected by the conduct. The number of people unwillingly exposed to 
the conduct and the circumstances in which they are exposed to it are 
critical under this head of harm. If the only people involved in or 
observing the conduct were willing participants, indecency on the basis of 
this harm will not be made out. 
 If the harm is based on predisposing others to anti-social behaviour, 
a real risk that the conduct will have this effect must be proved. Vague 
generalizations that the sexual conduct at issue will lead to attitudinal 
changes and hence anti-social behaviour will not suffice. The causal 
link between images of sexuality and anti-social behaviour cannot be 
assumed. Attitudes in themselves are not crimes, however deviant they 
may be or disgusting they may appear. What is required is proof  
of links, first between the sexual conduct at issue and the formation of 
negative attitudes, and second between those attitudes and real risk  
of anti-social behaviour. 
 Similarly, if the harm is based on physical or psychological injury 
to participants, it must again be shown that the harm has occurred or 
that there is a real risk that this will occur. Witnesses may testify as to 
actual harm. Expert witnesses may give evidence on the risks of potential 
harm. In considering psychological harm, care must be taken to avoid 
substituting disgust for the conduct involved, for proof of harm to the 
participants. In the case of vulnerable participants, it may be easier to 
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infer psychological harm than in cases where participants operate on 
an equal and autonomous basis. 
 These are matters that can and should be established by evidence, 
as a general rule.209 
Although the Court applies the “harm principle” on a routine basis, 
it may have rejected the characterization of the principle as fundamental 
in order to keep open the possibility that criminal law can serve paternalistic 
purposes. In the marijuana cases, the Court was clear in stating that “we 
do not accept the proposition that there is a general prohibition against 
the criminalization of harm to self.”210 The only examples the Court can 
point to of paternalistic criminalization are regulatory laws relating to 
“seatbelts and motorcycle helmets”,211 and these examples clearly do not 
prove that as a society we believe we can imprison people for their own 
good. Even though the Court has had occasion to say that “all criminal 
law is ‘paternalistic’ to some degree”,212 it is unclear what this means 
and from where this principle is derived. 
In a constitutional challenge to the anal intercourse prohibition on 
the basis of age discrimination, the state claimed it had a compelling 
interest in criminalizing anal intercourse under the age of 18 to protect 
the participants from a variety of medical harms.213 In dismissing this 
claim, Abella J.A. (as she then was) aptly describes why paternalism has 
no meaningful role to play in criminal law: 
 Health risks ought to be dealt with by the health care system . . . 
. . . . . 
 When governments define the ambits of morality, as they do when 
they enunciate laws, they are obliged to do so in accordance with 
constitutional guarantees, not with unwarranted assumptions. Sending 
young people to jail for their own protection when they exercise 
sexual choices not exercised by the majority, represents, in my view, 
even if benignly intended, precisely such unwarranted assumptions . . . 
. . . . . 
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There is no evidence that threatening to send an adolescent to jail will 
protect him (or her) from the risks of anal intercourse. I can see no 
rational connection between protecting someone from the potential 
harm of exercising serial preferences and imprisoning that individual 
for exercising them. There is no proportionality between the articulated 
health objectives and the draconian criminal means chosen to achieve 
them.214 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s endorsement of paternalism in 
criminal law is the most frightening aspect of the Court’s incoherent 
vision of criminal law. It is not simply bad public policy to incarcerate 
an individual for his or her own protection, but paternalism can lead to a 
political nightmare: 
Paternalism at its best entails well-meaning and justified interference 
with autonomous choice. But if in practice things do not work out for 
the best — if, for example, one’s leaders are incompetent, corrupt, 
stupid, or evil — paternalism is the royal road to totalitarianism, since 
it invites government to substitute for its citizens’ expressed preferences 
that which the state judges they “really” (objectively) want or need. This 
is a recipe for tyranny.215 
I do not think that the Supreme Court fully considered the implications 
of accepting paternalism as a proper goal of criminal law. The Court’s 
endorsement of paternalism just seemed to flow naturally from its 
replacement of the impugned goal of “legal moralism” with a “core 
values” approach to criminalization. Criminal law may not be used to 
dictate personal moral choices but “it is open for Parliament to legislate 
‘on the basis of some fundamental conception of morality for the purposes 
of safeguarding the values which are integral to a free and democratic 
society’” (emphasis in original).216 In the absence of demonstrable harm 
to others, the criminal law power can extend to “fundamental social and 
ethical considerations” and criminal prohibitions can be enacted to protect 
societal core values. Of course, as with the debate over harm, there will 
be different understandings of “core values”, but even in a “polycentric”217 
moral universe, the notion of “core” should mean that these values will 
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be few in number. The Supreme Court’s reformulation and narrowing of 
legal moralism as core value legislation provides some rational support 
for its puzzling endorsement of paternalism. Perhaps the Court was 
simply stating that paternalism can be invoked, and the consent of the 
participants overridden, if the end goal is the protection and preservation of 
core values. 
In the end it is difficult to ascertain whether the Supreme Court of 
Canada has a clear and coherent vision of the objectives of contemporary 
criminal law. In the midst of the confusion, one point emerges with 
clarity. Substantive review does not extend to questioning the wrongfulness 
of the actus reus. Even when the Court of Appeal of Ontario placed the 
harm principle on the short list of principles of fundamental justice, it 
was quick to point out that the principle “does not give the judiciary 
licence to review the wisdom of legislation”.218 Parliament is the sole 
judge of what is wrongful and this cannot be challenged directly by the 
judiciary. Parliamentary supremacy is pushed aside to review all the 
elements of an offence save and except for the presumed wrongfulness of 
the act or omission. This stubborn refusal to extend substantive review 
to this last element is based upon the conventional wisdom that reviewing 
the merits of law is beyond the competence and legitimacy of the judiciary. 
Unfortunately, reliance upon this conventional wisdom in the context of 
criminal law leads to the denial of another conventional wisdom relating 
to the transformative legal significance of consent and choice. 
3. Unifying Principles and the Legal Significance of Consent 
As mentioned at the outset, there is no single and simple unifying 
theory to explain the operation of criminal law, and one cannot really 
expect that the courts will have developed a consistent and coherent 
theoretical framework for understanding the minimum content of criminal 
law. The harm principle may be attractive to many and pervasive in 
modern thought, but the Supreme Court’s movement away from this 
simple proposition may reflect the fact that there are so many theoretical 
formulations of the concept of harm219 that the Court was concerned 
about the future implications of enshrining a principle filled with ambiguity. 
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It may have been a mistake to advance the harm principle as the 
governing principle for substantive review as the shifting sands of political 
theory may not present a coherent foundation for judicial intrusions into 
the political realm. It may have been more prudent to rely upon a narrower 
principle more recognizable in legal discourse. The marijuana possession 
offence is just one in a series of offences characteristically classified as 
“consensual crime” — crimes designed to “ban through criminal legislation 
the exchange between willing partners of strongly desired goods or 
services”.220 The common denominator of all consensual crimes is the 
unique fact that the participants do not see themselves as victims and 
through their consent express a desire to choose harm to themselves 
(and presumably not to cause harm to others or society — an issue that 
still is hotly debated). In light of the significance of consent in structuring 
many, if not most, legal arrangements, the focus of the fundamental 
justice inquiry should have revolved around the question of whether 
there is a “fundamental social or ethical consideration” to justify a legal 
prohibition on eliminating the absence of consent from the definition of 
the actus reus of a given crime. 
It has been said that consent is a “moral transformative” in that it 
“derives its normative power from the fact that it alters the obligations 
and permissions that collectively determine the rightness of others’ 
actions”.221 There is no doubt that the state may successfully argue that 
consent can be overridden in a specific context in order to protect “core 
values” based upon “fundamental social or ethical considerations”, but 
the fact remains that core value limitations on the exercise of consent 
should be fairly limited in a pluralistic society. With the exception of 
these few limitations on consent, the starting point for analysis should 
be the recognition that exercising choice is an inherent good because  
“to have the ability to create and dispel rights and duties is what it 
means to be an autonomous moral agent”.222 Therefore consent should 
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be presumptively effective to shield an actor from criminal law and the 
burden should be on the state to rebut the presumption. 
H.L.A. Hart analyzed the common features of ascriptions of liability 
in civil and criminal law and concluded that the conditions of liability 
are structured to maximize the effectiveness of choice: 
It is at this point that I would stress the analogy between mental 
conditions that excuse from criminal responsibility and the mental 
conditions that are regarded as invalidating civil transactions such as 
wills, gifts, contracts, marriages and the like. These institutions provide 
individuals with two inestimable advantages in relation to those areas 
of conduct they cover. These are (1) the advantage to the individual in 
determining by his choice what the future shall be and (2) the 
advantage of being able to predict what the future will be. . . . In brief, 
the function of these institutions of private law is to render effective 
the individual’s preferences in certain areas. . . . If with this in mind 
we turn back to criminal law and its excusing conditions, we can regard 
their function as a mechanism for similarly maximizing within the 
framework of criminal law the efficacy of the individual’s informed 
and considered choice in determining the future and also his power to 
predict the future.223 
The political value of actualizing choice found expression in a legal 
principle formulated 1,000 years earlier than the principle actus not facit 
reus nisi mens sit rea. Sixth-century Roman law recognized the maxim 
volenti non fit injuria (no wrong is done to one who consents). This 
principle was incorporated into British law in the 14th century and by 
the 17th century it became a maxim of British private law.224 Originally, 
the maxim had application in both civil and criminal law, but “changes 
in the power of an individual to consent to personal harm came in the 
seventeenth century” as a “natural consequence of the monopolization 
of the system of punishment by the state”.225 The maxim has never been 
seriously challenged but its significance in criminal law has been tempered 
by the growth of exceptions to the general rule that consent governs 
liability. 
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In the realm of criminal procedure the Supreme Court of Canada has 
recognized that the “scope of the criminal procedure power under 
section 91(27) [of the Constitution Act,1867226] needs to be re-evaluated 
in light of the evolution in our constitutional culture since the entrenchment 
of the Charter”.227 One critical part of this constitutional culture is the 
recognition that the law must facilitate an informed choice by the accused 
as to whether procedural rights can be waived in certain circumstances.228 
Once consent or waiver is present, the courts will allow this personal 
decision to override virtually all the constitutional obligations imposed 
upon the state by the Charter. For example, with respect to search and 
seizure, “the giving of consent has been treated as a private transaction 
between individuals, thus rendering irrelevant such public law issues as 
the sufficiency of the peace officer’s grounds for acting and the adherence 
to procedural prerequisites to intrusion.”229 In the area of self-incrimination, 
the Court has unequivocally stated that “the single most important 
organizing principle in criminal law is the right of an accused person not 
to be forced into assisting in his or her own prosecution.”230 The Court 
has stated that this “case to meet” principle is a “unifying thought” in 
criminal procedure, and the “central assumption of this theory is that 
criminal suspects should, as a matter of principle, have the freedom to 
choose whether to provide self-incriminating evidence to the state”.231 
In the fair distribution of rights and obligations in the criminal process, 
autonomous choice is a governing and dispositive legal event. Many 
legal structures can be explained and understood as reflecting a “protected 
choices” theory of rights: 
This theory, known as the choice, will or power theory, promotes the 
idea “of the right holder having the freedom to choose among a set of 
options, and of this freedom being protected by a set of duties imposed 
on others”. Modern rights theory sees a right as a complex of Hohfeldian 
positions that contains a core element and a protective perimeter of 
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associated elements. Regardless of whether we are dealing with a 
Hohfeldian claim right, power or immunity, the “unifying factor” is 
that “the law specifically recognizes the choice of an individual either 
negatively by not impeding or obstructing it (liberty and immunity) or 
affirmatively by giving legal effort to it (claim and power)”. 232 
There is no need to look beyond the substantive criminal law itself 
to find support for the proposition that the deep structure of law is 
designed to foster autonomous choice. Criminal liability is based upon 
the “culpability of choice”233 as manifested by a subjective mens rea. 
The endless and divisive debate over the proper role of negligence in the 
ascription of criminal liability arises from the fact that negligent acts do 
not reflect choice and are based upon a “culpability of inadvertence”.234 
On countless occasions, the Supreme Court of Canada has spoken of the 
“critical importance of autonomy in the attribution of criminal liability”: 
The treatment of criminal offenders as rational, autonomous and choosing 
agents is a fundamental, organizing principle of our criminal law. Its 
importance is reflected not only in the requirement that an act must  
be voluntary, but also in the condition that a wrongful act must be 
intentional to ground a conviction. . . . Like voluntariness, the requirement 
of a guilty mind is rooted in respect for individual autonomy and free 
will and acknowledges the importance of those values to a free and 
democratic society. . . . Criminal liability also depends on the capacity 
to choose — the ability to reason right from wrong. . . . this assumption 
of the rationality and autonomy of human beings forms part of the 
essential premises of Canadian criminal law.235  
(emphasis added) 
Choice is a “fundamental” and “essential” principle with respect to 
the mens rea, but for some reason it loses its potency when applied  
to the wrongful aspects of the actus reus. Therefore, in the world of 
constitutional adjudication, Parliament may be called upon to justify a 
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departure from the requirement that the offence contain a mens rea 
which reflects choosing harm to others, but it will never be required to 
justify the creation of a criminal actus reus which eliminates the legal 
significance of the consent of all the parties to the transaction. Not only 
are the courts ignoring the fundamental role consent plays in structuring 
legal arrangements, but they are also ignoring the fact that there may be 
a societal consensus recognizing the fundamental primacy of consent: 
[I]t is well documented that the public’s view of consensual harm 
differs dramatically from the one promoted by law. A famous study of 
the American jury has shown that from the jury’s perspective “insofar 
as the victim is disqualified from complaining, there is no cause for 
intervention by the state and its criminal law”.236 
The wide gap between the public’s perspective and the perspective 
of lawmakers was clearly demonstrated by the legacy of the Morgentaler237 
abortion cases — despite the formal or technical violation of the elements 
of the offence, juries consistently nullified the law by acquitting Dr. 
Morgentaler. 
The reluctance of the courts to embrace the absence of consent as an 
essential element of the actus reus seems to be based upon the courts’ 
fear that the apparent consent to choose harm may in actuality be a coerced 
choice. Looming behind the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize Sue 
Rodriguez’ right to assisted suicide was the fear that unscrupulous doctors 
and nurses will exploit the vulnerable and coercively persuade people to 
commit suicide. Similarly, in the sex club cases, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that 
[t]he consent of the participant will generally be significant in considering 
whether . . . harm is established. However, consent may be more apparent 
than real. Courts must always be on the lookout for the reality of 
victimization. . . . In the case of vulnerable participants, it may be 
easier to infer psychological harm than in cases where participants 
operate on an equal and autonomous basis.238 
It seems a bit disingenuous for courts to allow the consent of the 
participants to be overridden by legislative will simply because of a fear 
that the courts will not recognize a coerced choice. The determination of 
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whether choices are real or coerced is part of the courts’ daily business. 
Every time a confession is admitted into evidence, the courts have 
assessed the validity of consent, and in assault and sexual assault trials, 
the courts are often required to undertake an assessment of the reality of 
consent. The Supreme Court of Canada may have struggled in its attempt 
to illuminate the pre-conditions for a valid consent to sexual activity,  
but it has developed a coherent and comprehensive jurisprudence for 
distinguishing consent from coercion.239 
In a small handful of cases,240 the accused has argued for constitutional 
invalidation on the basis that a criminal offence does not require proof 
of an absence of consent or “because no defence of consent is available”.241 
The courts have summarily dismissed the claim that the “absence of 
consent” is a principle of fundamental justice. In dismissing the claim in 
the context of challenge to section 155 (incest among adults), the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal had little to say about the fundamental nature of 
consent in structuring legal relationships, but it was quick to point out 
that “[o]ne of the difficulties with this argument . . . is that the consent 
given in an incestuous relationship may be mere acquiescence.”242 
It is not surprising that courts give little weight to the express 
preferences and choices of accused persons, in light of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s troubling 1991 decision in Jobidon.243 Perhaps one can 
understand why a court would not want to second-guess a legislative 
decision to override consent, but in Jobidon, the Court actually read out 
the requirement of an “absence of consent” from the legislative definition 
of assault in cases where the accused intends and causes bodily harm. 
Relying upon a misguided invocation of the notion that “[a]ll criminal 
law is ‘paternalistic’ to some degree”,244 the Court second-guessed 
Parliament’s decision that people have the right to engage in consensual 
physical fights. The Court recognized that it would be imprudent to read 
out the significance of consent in all cases because of the implications 
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for “rough sporting activities” and “appropriate surgical interventions”.245 
Accordingly, the Court ruled that the “absence of consent” will remain 
an essential element of the offence of assault when “the activities have a 
positive social value and the intent of the actors is to produce a social 
benefit . . .”.246 
It is difficult to reconcile the Court’s aversion to reviewing the 
merits of law as part of substantive review with its willingness to 
reformulate the elements of the actus reus in accordance with its views 
on “social value”. More significantly, basing a decision to criminalize 
upon considerations of “social value” comes very close to the type of 
“legal moralism” the Court condemned as having no role to play in a 
modern, pluralistic society. Recognizing the fundamental primacy of 
consent, and only allowing this consent to be overridden when the state 
has a demonstrable compelling interest, is the most effective way to 
ensure that modern criminal law does not slide back to legal moralism. 
Overriding consent, especially for activities conducted in private, will 
always come perilously close to the impugned criminal law objective of 
“maintaining conventional standards of propriety”:247 
. . . individual choices that are not congruent with dominant social 
perceptions and preferences are routinely denied recognition by the 
criminal justice system. When collective preference or interest, and 
individual preference or choice are in conflict, the criminal law 
doctrines of Anglo-American legal systems are used to deny recognition 
and enforcement to individual preference. . . . Individual choices that 
do not coincide with the dominant interpretation of social values (and 
may also conflict with the interests of one of the more powerful social 
groups) can be ignored or disregarded with impunity. . . . Development 
in the law of consent to recognize and protect individual preference, 
even when that preference conflicts with societal convenience, would 
enhance the autonomy, dignity and quality of life of many people, 
especially members of disempowered social groups whose choices 
most need legal protection.248 
The reluctance to recognize the absence of consent as a fundamental 
component of a constitutionally valid actus reus is not simply related to 
the problem of ascertaining true consent. There is also a concern that 
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elevating the absence of consent to a constitutionally required element 
will open a Pandora’s box of evil. Extreme examples like consensual 
slavery and consensual cannibalism are often raised to counter the 
argument that consent is dispositive of liability. In fact, the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the marijuana challenges rejected the harm principle 
by invoking cannibalism as an example of an offence which is not 
predicated on this principle. Extreme examples of consensual harm can 
always be found but the exceptions should not govern the rule. In 
advocating the recognition of the primacy of consent, I would still have 
no difficulty convicting Armin Meiwes, who advertised on a chat room 
his interest in hiring someone for slaughter and a cannibalistic feast.249 It 
defies belief that the victim would accept this invitation, but apparently, 
before the ultimate slaughter Meiwes had cut off and fried a part of the 
victim’s body for the two of them to eat together. Despite the apparently 
genuine and perverse consent, it would be difficult to successfully argue 
that consent ought to operate in these extraordinary circumstances to 
shield the cannibal from murder charges. 
Extreme examples do not undercut the primacy of consent but they 
do demonstrate why the Supreme Court of Canada has endorsed a “core 
values” approach to criminalization. There is no need to resort to 
paternalism or legal moralism to condemn the actions of Meiwes as the 
state can raise core value objections to justify overriding a consent for 
mutilation, slaughter, cannibalism and murder: 
Meir Dan-Cohen, for example, argues that the reason society should 
outlaw slavery, even in the hypothetical case of voluntary “happy 
slaves” is because slavery represents a “paradigm of injustice” which 
“by its very terms denies people equal worth and thus treats them with 
disrespect”. Similarly, R.A. Duff finds voluntary gladiatorial contests 
unacceptable because of “dehumanization or degradation perpetrated 
by the gladiators on each other, and by the spectators on the gladiators 
and on themselves”. I agree with both Duff and Dan-Cohen that 
certain degrading behavior may be harmful, even though it does not 
violate the victim’s rights. Society may be concerned about human 
dignity even in cases in which a prohibitory norm does not originate in 
a rights violation, such as experiments involving fresh cadavers as 
“crash dummies” or pieces of art made with body parts of dead fetuses.250 
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Despite the fact that core value justifications for criminal law will 
be few and far between, the Supreme Court’s recognition of this modern 
version of legal moralism should encourage courts in the future to 
recognize the absence of consent as a fundamental principle of justice. 
The fear of the cannibal and other deviants who push the recognizable 
boundaries of consent being granted constitutional protection under this 
principle is unfounded in the presence of the availability of core value 
justifications for prohibiting this conduct. The only question remaining 
is whether the courts would ever consider endorsing a principle which 
by definition reverses the traditional burden of proof in Charter claims. 
Crowning the absence of consent as a fundamental principle is meaningless 
without the qualifier “unless the state has a compelling justification for 
overriding the participant’s consent”. Therefore, the very formulation of 
the principle builds in a requirement that the state justify the intrusion 
into autonomous choice. The doctrinal purist will insist that the state 
only bears the burden of demonstrating a compelling justification when 
it comes to the reasonable limits assessment under section 1 of the 
Charter, but as criminal law continues to expand in an unprincipled 
manner, there may come a time when the Court recognizes the political 
and constitutional benefits that can be reaped by imposing a burden of 
justification on the state whenever a criminal offence eliminates absence 
of consent from the definition of the actus reus. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Beyond the constitutionalization of fault, substantive review of criminal 
law has not led to a clearly defined collection of concrete principles 
designed to set minimum standards for the ascription of criminal liability. 
Some progress has been established with respect to the principles of 
fault, but judicial review loses it potency when it approaches actus reus 
issues above and beyond the core principle that all acts must be voluntary. 
Our judiciary has not embraced the notion advanced by L’Heureux-
Dubé J., in her dissenting opinion to uphold some forms of constructive 
murder, on the basis that “the assessment of moral guilt depends on a 
view of the whole circumstances, and not on the distinction between the 
presence or absence of a particular mental event such as the foresight 
and acceptance of a risk.”251 In her view, an offender’s fault is not 
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restricted to evaluations of mental states, but includes an analysis of the 
degree of fault and blameworthiness which is built into the actus reus 
component of a crime. The “denigration of actus reus”252 has led the 
courts to abandon any effort to determine whether Parliament has 
constructed an actus reus which bears a rational relationship to harmful 
conduct deserving of punishment. 
Understandably, a foray into evaluating the content of the actus reus 
compels the Court to enter the political realm to assess Parliamentary 
justifications for depriving people of liberty for the commission of the 
stipulated actus reus elements. The Court’s reluctance stems from the 
celebration of legislative supremacy, but once the “pathological politics” 
of criminal law reform is understood there is little reason to cling to a 
political precept which may be responsible for massive overcriminalization 
and creating an undue burden on limited justice resources. As Professor 
Stuntz has noted: 
If criminal law is inescapably political, both in the sense that it rests on 
contestable value judgments and in the sense that it embodies trade-
offs between different values, it seems natural to assign responsibility 
for it to the most politically accountable actors [i.e., legislatures]. My 
response to that argument is not to deny its premise. Rather, I seek to 
show that legislator’s political incentives are to criminalize too much 
— with “too much” defined by the preferences of the very constituents 
whose wishes legislators are supposed to represent. Once one understands 
those incentives, one may conclude that courts are more likely than 
legislatures to capture social value judgments accurately.253 
The problem with the current approach to substantive review is that 
the courts have not constructed any doctrinal tools to combat a legislature 
gone bad. Perhaps the Supreme Court had a basis for upholding the 
obscenity provisions, the marijuana possession offence and other 
consensual crimes of dubious validity, but its outright rejection of the 
harm principle, or a related principle relating to the primacy of choice 
and consent, is somewhat myopic. There was no reason to throw the 
baby out with the bath water. The courts should maintain some control 
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of the criminalization process, and they should be developing doctrine 
which will allow an assessment of the wrongfulness of the actus reus in 
rare cases in which Parliament has succumbed to the unprincipled 
influence of a moral panic. 
Even if one believes in the reality of electoral accountability as a 
real constraint on political action, it is naive to assume that the process 
can never short-circuit. I am certain that courts are aware of this possibility, 
but they tend to adopt a cavalier “wait and see” attitude, believing that if 
a true political short-circuit were to happen, the courts will be able to 
fashion some constraint when the time arrives. This cavalier attitude of 
“wait and see” crippled the U.S. Supreme Court in terms of its ability to 
protect privacy,254 and, to my dismay, we can see our Supreme Court 
starting to adopt this approach. In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada 
concluded that there is no constitutional protection in relation to law 
enforcement’s use of infra-red technology because the current technology 
was fairly non-intrusive. It is beyond dispute that the technology will 
clearly be improved and will become more intrusive, yet the Court was 
content to lie back and wait:  
Whatever evolution occurs in the future will have to be dealt with by 
the courts step by step . . . [i]f as expected, the capability of FLIR 
[infrared] and other technologies will improve . . . it will be a different 
case, and the courts will have to deal with its privacy implications at 
that time. . . .255 
It is more prudent to set constitutional constraints in advance to nip 
a crisis in the bud than to struggle to develop constraints in the face of 
the crisis. 
Perhaps the Court cannot be faulted for a failure to develop a 
coherent theoretical framework for assessing the merits and validity of 
the content of criminal law — theory can be divisive and indeterminate 
and conventional thinking has always asserted that the merits of law are 
beyond judicial review. More disconcerting than the failure to operate 
upon a clear theoretical vision of the purpose of criminal law is the 
Court’s lack of understanding that “the danger is not that our few prized 
liberties will expire in some anguished and bloody battle, but rather by 
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slow degrees, by slight turnings of the screw, by steady constant erosion, 
they will slowly disappear”.256 Parliament may never enact ridiculous 
offences, such as the sausage prohibition discussed at the outset of the 
paper, but if substantive review cannot serve to place some constraints upon 
the criminalization process, there will never be an effective constitutional 
obstacle to prevent Parliament from slowly turning the screw of criminal 
law to gradually erode liberty in the quest for false security. 
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